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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether the First Amendment protects a speaker 
against a state-law right-of-publicity claim that 
challenges the realistic use of a person’s name or 
likeness in an expressive work. 
  
ii 
 
 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The Defendant-Appellant below, who is the 
Petitioner before this Court, is Electronic Arts Inc.  
The Plaintiffs-Appellees below, who are the 
Respondents before this Court, are Samuel Michael 
Keller; Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr.; Byron Bishop; 
Michael Anderson; Danny Wimprine; Ishmael Thrower; 
Craig Newsome; Damien Rhodes; and Samuel 
Jacobson. 
Respondents sued two additional Defendants, the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association and Collegiate 
Licensing Company, but they were not parties in the 
Ninth Circuit proceedings. 
  
iii 
 
 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioner states that it has 
no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation 
owns ten percent or more of Petitioner’s stock. 
  
iv 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......... iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vii 
OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1 
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED.............................. 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 2 
A. Factual Background ..................................... 6 
B. Procedural Background ................................ 7 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...... 13 
I. The Lower Courts Are In Disarray 
Concerning the First Amendment Limits 
on Right-of-Publicity Claims. ........................... 15 
A. The Ninth and Third Circuits’  
Transformative-Use Test Protects an 
Expressive Work Only if the Plaintiff’s 
Likeness Is “Transformed.” ........................ 15 
v 
 
 
B. The Constitutional Test Adopted Below 
Is Inconsistent With Tests Applied By 
Other Courts. ............................................. 17 
1. Four Circuits and Two State 
Supreme Courts Have Held that the 
First Amendment Protects Non-
Commercial Speech Depicting Well-
Known People, Even if the 
Depiction Is Not “Transformed.” .......... 17 
2. Other Courts Engage in Case-
Specific Balancing. ................................ 20 
II. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle For 
Addressing the Constitutional Question. ......... 23 
III. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Is Wrong and 
Conflicts with This Court’s First 
Amendment Jurisprudence. ............................. 24 
A. The Adopted Transformative-Use Test 
Does Not Adequately Respect First 
Amendment Rights. ................................... 24 
B. The Transformative-Use Test Will Chill 
Protected Speech Because It Is 
Overbroad and Unpredictable. ................... 29 
C. Case-Specific Balancing Is Equally 
Problematic. ............................................... 34 
vi 
 
 
D. The Rogers Test Confines the Right of 
Publicity to Circumstances Where Its 
Application Does Not Violate the First 
Amendment. ............................................... 35 
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 36 
 
Appendix A 
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. 10-15387, 
724 F.3d 1268, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649 
(9th Cir. July 31, 2013) ................................................. 1a 
 
Appendix B 
Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 
CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) ....... 45a 
 
Appendix C 
Order Denying Rehearing, In re NCAA 
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litigation, No. 10-15387 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 
2013) .............................................................................. 71a 
 
  
vii 
 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
CASES 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) ..................... 25 
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ....................... 30 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 ( 2001)............ 24, 25 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 
188 U.S. 239 (1903) ................................................... 31 
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc, No. 09-56675, 
724 F.3d 1235, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15647 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013) ...................... 10, 23, 24 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) ........................... 4, 8, 26, 33, 34 
Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 740 S.E.2d 
622 (Ga. 2013) ............................................................ 19 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 
  1996) ................................................................. 2, 22, 34 
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing., Inc. v. 
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) ........ 20, 21, 28, 34 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.  
 2001) ........................................................... 9, 16, 17, 31 
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 
2003) ........................................................................... 22 
viii 
 
 
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 
(D.N.J. 1981) ............................................................. 30 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 
915 (6th Cir. 2003) ...................................... 3, 5, 18, 19 
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) .................... 2 
Hart v. Electronic Arts Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d 
Cir. 2013) ............................................... 4, 9, 16, 31, 32 
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th 
Cir. 2010) ......................................................... 3, 15, 32 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 
F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) ..................................... 3, 32 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988) .......................................................................... 29 
Illinois ex. rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing 
Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003) ........................... 33 
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 
4th 47 (2006) ................................................................ 3 
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 
(Cal. 1979) .................................................................. 26 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social 
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage 
Products, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) ............... 3 
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 
1994) ....................................................................... 3, 18 
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 
Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995) .......................................... 22 
ix 
 
 
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524 
(Ky. 2001) .................................................................. 19 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964) .......................................................................... 28 
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 192 
Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011) .......................................... 3 
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th 
Cir. 2003) ............................................................... 2, 18 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ......... 25 
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984)  .................. 25 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ........................... 30 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989) ....................................................................... 9, 18 
Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 
723 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457 
(6th Cir. 2001) ............................................................. 2 
Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331 
(E.D. Pa. 1996) ............................................................ 2 
The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) ....... 29 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)  ........................ 2 
Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing Group, LLC, 572 
F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009) ....................................... 22 
Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co. 
L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) .......................... 3, 19 
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 
(2012) .................................................................... 25, 26 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460  
x 
 
 
 (2010) ........................................................ 25, 26, 29, 34 
Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th 
Cir. 1983) ......................................................... 2, 18, 19 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976) ................................................... 35 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting 
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) ......................................... 3, 4 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. amend I ....................................................... 2 
STATUTES 
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .......................................................... 1 
Cal. Civil Code § 3344(d) .............................................. 11 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
John Broder, Schwarzenegger Files Suit 
Against Bobblehead Maker, N.Y. Times, 
May 18, 2004), at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2004/05/18/national/18arnold.html ................... 3 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the 
Right of Publicity Can Learn from 
Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 
(2006) ...................................................................... 6, 27 
F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a 
Stooge: The ‘Transformativeness’ Test for 
Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to 
a Right of Publicity Claim Against 
Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 Colum. 
J.L. & Arts 1 (2003) ................................................... 6 
xi 
 
 
Adam Liptak, When it May Not Pay To be 
Famous, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2013, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-the-
first-amendment-and-right-of-
publicity.html .............................................................. 6 
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public 
Image: Popular Culture & Publicity 
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127 (1993) .......................... 27 
1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of 
Publicity and Privacy (2013 ed.) ..................... 13, 26 
Aaron Moss, When It Comes to the Right of 
Publicity, Yes, Doubt (February 18, 2011) ........... 17 
Andrea Peterson, U.S. Court Limits How Art 
Can Imitate Life, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 2013, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/02/us-
court-limits-how-art-can-imitate-life/ ..................... 6 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) ....................... 13 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
(1995) .................................................................... 14, 20 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the 
Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 903 
(2003) ................................................................ 6, 25, 27 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a 
Thumb on the Constitutional Scale: 
Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights, 
50 B.C. L. Rev. 1503 (2009) ....................................... 6 
1 
 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit affirming the denial 
by the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California of Petitioner’s special motion to 
strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute is 
reported at 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) and 
reproduced at Appendix to the Petition (“Pet. App.”) 
1a.  The order of the Ninth Circuit granting Petitioner’s 
subsequent motion to stay the mandate pending 
proceedings in this Court is unreported and reproduced 
at Pet. App. 71a. 
An opinion of the District Court denying 
Petitioner’s motion to dismiss and anti-SLAPP special 
motion to strike is unreported and reproduced at Pet. 
App. 45a. 
JURISDICTION 
The Ninth Circuit issued its opinion on July 31, 
2013.1  The jurisdiction of this Court is properly 
invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).   
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
This case involves the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
                                                 
1
 The Ninth Circuit applied its rule that a denial of an anti-SLAPP 
special motion to strike is reviewable under the collateral order 
doctrine.  Pet. App. 5a n. 3 (citing Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. 
Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
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of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.”  U.S. Const. amend I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the collision of the First 
Amendment and the state-law “right-of-publicity” tort, 
an issue that has engendered conflict and disarray 
among the lower courts.  The right of publicity is a 
modern tort, first recognized in 1953.2  Generally used 
by celebrities, it accords persons an economic right in 
their names and likenesses, so they may “profit from 
the full commercial value of their identities.”  
Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996). 
In recent years, right-of-publicity suits have 
proliferated, targeting a variety of speech and 
speakers, including musicians who named famous 
people in their lyrics; filmmakers who produced movies 
documenting the lives of celebrities and historical 
figures; authors who wrote “unauthorized biographies”; 
magazines and greeting-card manufacturers who used 
celebrity images; video-game makers who used 
celebrity images in constructing virtual worlds; and 
artists who depicted celebrities in their artworks.3   
                                                 
2
 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d 
Cir. 1953).   
3
See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(OutKast song lyrics); Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (Bob Dylan song lyrics); Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 
F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (feature movie and book about the 
Black Panther Party); Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 
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Courts have struggled to reconcile this new tort 
with the protections afforded by the First Amendment.  
This Court’s only contribution came nearly forty years 
ago in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 
433 U.S. 562 (1977), in which the Court held that the 
First Amendment did not bar a right-of-publicity claim 
against a television station that broadcast an 
entertainer’s entire human-cannonball act.  According 
to the Court, broadcasting Zacchini’s entire act posed a 
“substantial threat to the economic value of that 
performance,” and the Court contrasted the use of a 
performer’s “entire act” with the broadcast of a 
person’s name or picture in media.  Id. at 574-76.  Thus, 
Zacchini offers little or no guidance in cases involving 
mere depictions of individuals, as opposed to 
appropriation of their actual performances in full.   
Indeed, the Court was careful to cabin its decision: 
“[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be 
drawn between media reports that are protected and 
                                                                                                    
723 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001) (television 
miniseries about the Temptations); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t 
Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) (movie about a shipwreck); 
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994) (book about a 
police officer); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 
(9th Cir. 2001) (magazine using image of Dustin Hoffman); Hilton 
v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (greeting card 
using image of Paris Hilton); Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. 
App. 4th 47 (2006) (video game); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, 
Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011) (video game); Martin Luther 
King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (bust of Martin Luther King, Jr.); ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (lithograph 
of Tiger Woods); John Broder, Schwarzenegger Files Suit Against 
Bobblehead Maker, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2004, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/18/national/18arnold.html. 
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those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media 
when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without 
his consent.”  Id. at 574-75. 
The expressive work at issue in this case is 
Petitioner’s college football video game, which was 
alleged to include a realistic depiction of former college 
football player Respondent Samuel Keller.4  The Ninth 
Circuit (and the Third Circuit, in an essentially 
identical case also before this Court on petition for writ 
of certiorari)5 held that the First Amendment offered 
no defense to Keller’s right-of-publicity claim, because 
the game’s depiction of Keller was too realistic and 
showed him engaged in the same activity—college 
football—in which he had gained his fame.  
The Ninth and Third Circuits recognized that 
Petitioner’s video game was an expressive work, under 
this Court’s holding in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).  Nonetheless, 
they held that the game’s depiction of the plaintiffs did 
not enjoy First Amendment protection.  According to 
the Ninth and Third Circuits, the depiction of a 
person’s image or likeness in an expressive work enjoys 
First Amendment protection against a right-of-
                                                 
4
 The consolidated action actually was brought by Keller and eight 
other named plaintiffs, some of whom are former college football 
players and some of whom are former college basketball players 
who allege they were portrayed in Petitioner’s NCAA Basketball 
video game.  Because they were all identically situated, the Ninth 
Circuit treated the case as one brought by Keller and we do so 
here as well. 
5
 Hart v. Elec. Arts Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).    
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publicity claim only if the depiction sufficiently alters or  
“transforms” the plaintiff’s image or likeness.  That rule 
is constitutionally perverse:  it affords First 
Amendment protection only to fanciful or distorted 
portrayals, not accurate or realistic ones.  The rule also 
chills expression, both because it is hard to predict 
what a court will decide is sufficiently 
“transformative,” and because such an inquiry 
inevitably requires a court to make a subjective 
judgment about whether a depiction is “artistic,” thus 
warranting protection, or “literal,” and thus subject to 
liability.   
The test adopted by these two circuits, moreover, 
conflicts with various other tests adopted by other 
circuits and state supreme courts, which do not focus on 
transformation at all.  Some of these courts engage in 
case-by-case balancing of First Amendment interests 
and right-of-publicity interests—an approach that 
raises its own constitutional problems.  Others give 
appropriate respect to the First Amendment by 
confining the right-of-publicity tort to circumstances in 
which the challenged depiction falsely claims a celebrity 
commercial endorsement or is unrelated to any other 
expression and thus gratuitous.   
The lower courts’ various and conflicting 
constitutional tests have resulted in numerous 
irreconcilable outcomes.  For example, the Sixth 
Circuit has held that the First Amendment protects the 
inclusion of a professional golfer’s realistic image, 
prominently displayed in a painted montage including 
other golfers, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 
915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003), but the Ninth and Third 
Circuits now have held that the First Amendment does 
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not protect an accurate digital depiction of a former 
college football player in a video game.  As the judicial 
confusion has mounted, scholars, writers, and artists 
have begun to recognize a major threat to free 
expression.6  This Court’s guidance is urgently needed.                  
A. Factual Background 
Petitioner Electronic Arts’ enormously popular 
NCAA Football video game series, first unveiled in 
1993, artistically creates a fictional interactive college 
football gaming experience.  In each annual edition of 
NCAA Football, users can play individual games or 
entire seasons, selecting from unnamed virtual players 
from each college’s teams.  Pet. App. 3a.  The virtual 
football games occur in virtual stadiums filled with 
virtual fans, coaches, cheerleaders, mascots, and 
referees, all meticulously crafted by Electronic Arts’ 
video game designers.  Id. at 4a.   
                                                 
6
 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of 
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 
(2006); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The 
‘Transformativeness’ Test for Analyzing a First Amendment 
Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a 
Work of Art, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2003); Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 
903 (2003); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb on 
the Constitutional Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity 
Rights, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1503 (2009); Adam Liptak, When it May 
Not Pay To be Famous, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-the-
first-amendment-and-right-of-publicity.html; Andrea Peterson, 
U.S. Court Limits How Art Can Imitate Life, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 
2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/08/02/us-court-limits-how-art-can-imitate-life/. 
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The virtual players (“avatars”) are clothed in their 
teams’ uniforms and logos.  The unnamed avatars are 
identified only by position and jersey number (e.g., QB 
#7) but are meant to evoke real players.  Thus, for 
example, an avatar may have an appearance (e.g., 
height, weight, skin-tone, and throwing arm) and 
biographical information (e.g., class year) that match 
those of a real player.  Id. at 3a-4a.   
Within this realistic setting, the game fosters the 
user’s creativity and interactivity.  Users control the 
avatars in invented games and seasons.  The game also 
includes a mode in which the user “coaches” a college 
team for up to thirty seasons to develop a school’s 
football program over time.  Id. at 4a.  Another mode 
allows users to control a single virtual player from high 
school through college, directing the virtual player’s 
choices regarding practices, academics, and social life—
all of which affect the virtual player’s performance in a 
game.  Id.   As Judge Thomas put it in his dissent, “At 
its essence, EA’s NCAA Football is a work of 
interactive historical fiction.”  Id. at 34a. 
B. Procedural Background 
1. Respondent Samuel Keller played as 
quarterback for Arizona State University in 2005, after 
which he transferred to the University of Nebraska, 
where he played football during the 2007 season.  Id. at 
3a.  In May 2009, Keller filed this putative class action 
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California against Electronic Arts, 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), 
and the Collegiate Licensing Company; the district 
court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
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Keller alleged that Petitioner violated his California 
statutory and common law right of publicity, among 
other claims, and sought hundreds of millions of dollars 
in damages on behalf of the putative class and an 
injunction prohibiting the use of players’ identities in 
the future and mandating the seizure and destruction of 
all copies of NCAA Football in Electronic Arts’ 
possession.  C.A. App. 147-48.  The district court 
granted motions to consolidate Keller’s case with those 
of eight other college athletes. 
Keller’s right-of-publicity claim was based on the 
alleged use of his biographical information and likeness 
in the 2005 and 2008 editions of NCAA Football.  Pet. 
App. 4a-5a.  He claimed the game included an animated 
avatar of a quarterback wearing Arizona State 
University and University of Nebraska uniforms with 
his physical and biographical attributes and career 
statistics, though not his name or photographic image. 
Petitioner moved to dismiss and also filed a special 
motion to strike the lawsuit as a strategic lawsuit 
against public participation, pursuant to California’s 
anti-SLAPP statute.  The District Court denied both 
motions.  Id. at 69a.   
2. In July 2013, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
District Court’s denial of Electronic Arts’ anti-SLAPP 
motion to strike.  Pet. App. 30a.  The court 
acknowledged that, under this Court’s holding in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 
2729 (2011), video games are expression that enjoy “the 
full protections of the First Amendment.”  Pet. App. 2a.  
Nevertheless, the court decided that Electronic Arts 
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had no First Amendment defense to Keller’s right-of-
publicity claim.  Id. at 30a.   
In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted a version of the transformative-use test, which 
it derived from Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).  The test it 
adopted is essentially identical to the one adopted by 
the Third Circuit in Hart v. Electronic Arts Inc., 717 
F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013), the other case currently 
pending on a petition for certiorari.  That test protects 
expression depicting celebrities only if “the work in 
question adds significant creative elements so as to be 
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity 
likeness or imitation.”  Pet. App. 8a (quoting Comedy 
III, 21 P.3d at 799).   
Here, the Ninth Circuit held Electronic Arts’ 
alleged use of Keller’s likeness “does not qualify for 
First Amendment protection as a matter of law 
because it literally recreates Keller in the very setting 
in which he has achieved renown.”  Id. at 3a; see id. at 
14a (holding that the video game did not sufficiently 
transform Keller’s likeness because it portrayed Keller 
“as what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona 
State and Nebraska, and the game’s setting is identical 
to where the public found Keller during his collegiate 
career: on the football field” (internal quotation marks 
and alteration omitted)).   
Petitioner argued that the court should adopt the 
test announced in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d 
Cir. 1989), contending that this test appropriately 
protected First Amendment rights.  Under that test, 
an expressive work is accorded First Amendment 
10 
 
 
protection against right-of-publicity claims unless the 
celebrity’s likeness is unrelated to the work or is used 
in a manner that falsely indicates that the celebrity has 
endorsed the product.  See Pet. App. 21a.  
The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument.  Id. at 
26a.  The court reasoned that the Rogers test was 
developed to accommodate First Amendment interests 
in the context of trademark law, which focuses on the 
risk of consumer confusion.  Id. at 23a.  However, the 
court continued, “[t]he right of publicity protects the 
celebrity, not the consumer.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  
Thus, the court concluded, “[t]he reasoning of . . . 
Rogers . . . that artistic and literary works should be 
protected unless they explicitly mislead consumers[] is 
simply not responsive to Keller’s asserted interests 
here.”  Id. at 24a.  
Notably, the same Ninth Circuit panel, in an opinion 
released the same day as Keller, held that the First 
Amendment provided Electronic Arts with a defense to 
a Lanham Act claim brought by a former NFL player 
in connection with another of its video games, Madden 
NFL Football.  See Brown v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 
1235, No. 09-56675, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15647 (9th 
Cir. July 31, 2013).  Applying the Rogers test, the court 
concluded the video game was “entitled to the same 
First Amendment protection as great literature, plays, 
or books. . . . The Rogers test tells us that, in this case, 
the public interest in free expression outweighs the 
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion.”  Id. at 
*32.  Keller cited the decision in Brown, and 
acknowledged that Keller would have been “hard-
pressed” to succeed on his right-of-publicity claim if the 
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court had applied the Rogers test to that claim.  Pet. 
App. 23a-24a.  
Finally, the court rejected two additional defenses, 
the public interest exception and the statutory public 
affairs exception.  Id. at 29a.7  
Judge Thomas forcefully dissented, warning that 
the Court had engaged in a “potentially dangerous and 
out-of-context interpretation of the transformative use 
test.”  Id. at 44a (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Judge 
Thomas noted that he “agree[s] fully with Judge 
Ambro’s excellent dissent in Hart,” id. at 34a n.2, and 
criticized the majority for “confin[ing] its inquiry to 
how a single athlete’s likeness is represented in the 
video game, rather than examining the transformative 
and creative elements in the video game as a whole[,] . . 
. . contradict[ing] the holistic analysis required by the 
transformative use test,” id. at 33a.  In particular, 
Judge Thomas highlighted that   
The gamers can . . . change [the virtual players’] 
abilities, appearances, and physical 
characteristics at will.  Keller’s impressive 
physical likeness can be morphed by the gamer 
into an overweight and slow virtual athlete, with 
anemic passing ability.  And the gamer can 
create new virtual players out of whole cloth.  
Players can change teams.  The gamer could pit 
Sam Keller against himself, or a stronger or 
weaker version of himself, on a different team.  
                                                 
7
 California’s right-of-publicity statute exempts from liability uses 
“in connection with any news, public affairs, sports broadcast or 
account, or any political campaign.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d). 
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Or the gamer could play the game endlessly 
without ever encountering Keller’s avatar.  In 
the simulated games, the gamer controls not 
only the conduct of the game, but the weather, 
crowd noise, mascots, and other environmental 
factors.  Of course, one may play the game 
leaving the players unaltered, pitting team 
against team.  But, in this context as well, the 
work is one of historic fiction.  The gamer 
controls the teams, players, and games. 
Id. at 35a.  Judge Thomas concluded that, “unlike the 
majority, [he] would not punish EA for the realism of 
its games and for the skill of the artists who created 
realistic settings for the football games.”  Id. at 37a. 
Judge Thomas also emphasized that “the essence of 
NCAA Football is founded on publicly available data, 
which is not protected by any individual publicity 
rights,” id. at 39a, that the players names are not used 
in the game, id. at 40a, and that, under the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules, “an individual college athlete’s right 
of publicity is extraordinarily circumscribed and, in 
practical reality, non-existent,” id. at 41a-42a.  In 
conclusion, Judge Thomas addressed the potential 
scope of the majority’s opinion:  
The logical consequence of the majority view is 
that all realistic depictions of actual persons, no 
matter how incidental, are protected by a state 
law right of publicity regardless of the creative 
context.  This logic jeopardizes the creative use 
of historic figures in motion pictures, books, and 
sound recordings.  Absent the use of actual 
footage, the motion picture Forrest Gump might 
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as well be just a box of chocolates.  Without its 
historical characters, Midnight in Paris would 
be reduced to a pedestrian domestic squabble. 
Id. at 43a.   
The majority rejected Judge Thomas’ warning that 
its opinion jeopardized a broad swath of valuable 
expression on the theory that later courts could 
examine the “primary motivation” of those who are 
likely to purchase (rather than create) the expressive 
work.  It posited that First Amendment protection 
would turn on whether the primary motivation of the 
buyer is to acquire the “expressive work of [an] artist” 
or to acquire a “reproduction of the celebrity.”  Id. at 
19a n.10. 
 On August 21, 2013, the Court of Appeals granted 
Electronic Arts’ motion to stay the mandate pending 
the outcome of proceedings before this Court.  Id. at 
72a. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
This Court’s review is urgently needed to resolve 
conflicting authority concerning First Amendment 
protection against right-of-publicity claims.  Since its 
invention in the second half of the twentieth century,8 
                                                 
8
 The precise formulation of the tort varies from state to state.  See 
J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 6.6-
6.133  (2d ed. 2000) (describing varying state-law formulations).  
California has both a statutory and a common law cause of action.  
See Pet. App. 5a.  Some other states follow the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1977), which provides that “[o]ne who 
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of 
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy.”  
Id. § 652C.  Still other states follow the more narrow formulation 
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the right of publicity increasingly has been used in 
litigation against creators of expressive works—
including filmmakers, authors, musicians, and others—
whose expression includes the depiction of a real 
person.  In this case, the Ninth Circuit applied a 
transformative-use test that makes First Amendment 
protection depend upon whether the depiction distorts 
reality enough to be deemed “transformative.”  The 
more accurate and realistic the depiction, the greater 
the likelihood of liability.  Other courts use a different 
legal test, extending First Amendment protection to 
expressive depictions of people regardless of whether 
they are realistic or “transformed,” unless those uses 
amount to commercial endorsements.  Still other courts 
engage in case-by-case balancing of First Amendment 
interests against the economic interests protected by 
the right of publicity.      
This disarray and conflict has real-world 
consequences:  without this Court’s guidance, artists, 
musicians, and other content creators will be unsure 
what standards apply to their expression and, in 
particular, whether the realistic depiction of real 
individuals is tortious.  If the realistic portrayal of a 
                                                                                                    
of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995), under 
which “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s 
identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or 
other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to 
liability.”  See id. § 46 (emphasis added).  The phrase “for purposes 
of trade” means “used in advertising the user’s goods or services, 
or . . . placed on merchandise marketed by the user,” and “does not 
ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, 
commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in 
advertising that is incidental to such uses.”  Id. § 47.   
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person in an expressive work can strip the work of 
First Amendment protection, then countless creative 
works are at risk of suit, including films like The Social 
Network, 42, A Beautiful Mind, and All the President’s 
Men; documentaries like Ken Burns’ Baseball and Jazz; 
works of historical fiction like E.L. Doctorow’s Ragtime 
and Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow; and 
“unauthorized biographies” like those by Kitty Kelley.  
All of these works realistically portray actual 
individuals in the contexts that made them famous and 
use their biographical details.  The effect of this 
uncertainty is to chill protected expression, all in the 
name of a tort with questionable underlying purposes.  
This Court should grant review to resolve the conflicts 
and provide clear direction.  
I. The Lower Courts Are In Disarray 
Concerning the First Amendment Limits on 
Right-of-Publicity Claims. 
A. The Ninth and Third Circuits’  
Transformative-Use Test Protects an 
Expressive Work Only if the Plaintiff’s 
Likeness Is “Transformed.”  
This case is the first time the Ninth Circuit has held 
that the First Amendment protects the use of a 
person’s image or likeness in expressive speech only if 
the image or likeness is sufficiently “transformed,”9 and 
does not protect “realistic[] portray[als].”  Pet. App. 
                                                 
9
 The Ninth Circuit previously applied the transformative-use test 
as a state-law defense in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 
(9th Cir. 2010), but it did not decide in that case whether the 
transformative-use test defines the scope of First Amendment 
protection.  See id. at 909 n.11.   
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19a.  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit followed the Third 
Circuit’s formulation of the transformative-use test in 
Hart, 717 F.3d at 165.   
The transformative-use test was first articulated in 
2001, when the California Supreme Court addressed a 
right-of-publicity claim based on a charcoal drawing of 
The Three Stooges.  Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799.   That 
court borrowed from copyright fair-use doctrine and 
adopted what it described as “essentially a balancing 
test . . . based on whether the work in question adds 
significant creative elements so as to be transformed 
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or 
imitation.”  Id.  Applying that test to the facts at hand, 
the court found the Three Stooges drawing, sold as a 
lithograph and on t-shirts, to be insufficiently 
transformative.  Id. at 811.  It explained that the 
artist’s “undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to 
the overall goal of creating literal, conventional 
depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit their 
fame.”  Id.   
In so holding, the California Supreme Court 
distinguished the drawing at issue from Andy Warhol’s 
portraits of celebrities such as Marilyn Monroe, 
Elizabeth Taylor, and Elvis Presley. It explained: 
“Through distortion and the careful manipulation of 
context, Warhol was able to convey a message that 
went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity 
images and became a form of ironic social comment on 
the dehumanization of celebrity itself.”  Id.  
Underscoring the unpredictability of its test, the court 
acknowledged that the difference between works that 
enjoy constitutional protections (like Warhol’s 
depictions of Marilyn Monroe) and those that do not 
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(like the Three Stooges sketch) will “sometimes be 
subtle.”  Id.10   
B. The Constitutional Test Adopted Below Is 
Inconsistent With Tests Applied By Other 
Courts. 
Other circuits and state supreme courts have 
adopted a different constitutional approach, applying 
different First Amendment tests that do not depend on 
a depiction’s transformative character—albeit tests 
that themselves conflict with one another.   
1. Four Circuits and Two State Supreme 
Courts Have Held that the First Amendment 
Protects Non-Commercial Speech Depicting 
Well-Known People, Even if the Depiction Is 
Not “Transformed.” 
The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, 
along with the Florida and Kentucky Supreme Courts, 
all have held that the First Amendment protects the 
depiction of an individual within an expressive work, 
unless the depiction amounts to an unauthorized 
commercial endorsement or is unrelated to any other 
expression and thus gratuitous. 
In Rogers, the Second Circuit considered a federal 
Lanham Act claim and a state right-of-publicity claim 
brought by Ginger Rogers against the makers of a 
Federico Fellini film entitled “Ginger and Fred”—a 
                                                 
10
 See Aaron Moss, When It Comes to the Right of Publicity, Yes, 
Doubt (February 18, 2011) 
http://www.lawlawlandblog.com/2011/02/when_it_comes_to_the_ri
ght_of.html (displaying the Marilyn Monroe painting and the 
Three Stooges sketch side by side).  
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film not about Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, but 
instead about a fictional Italian duo who imitated them, 
becoming known in Italy as “Ginger and Fred.”  875 
F.2d at 996-97.  The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the 
filmmaker, holding first that the First Amendment 
protects the use of a person’s name in a film title from a 
Lanham Act claim unless the use was “‘wholly 
unrelated’ to the movie or was ‘simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or 
services.’”  Id. at 1004; see id. at 998-1000.  The court 
then applied essentially the same standard in rejecting 
Rogers’ right-of-publicity claim under Oregon law.  Id. 
at 1004-05. 
Other courts have applied the Rogers standard or a 
similar test in describing the First Amendment limits 
to right-of-publicity claims.  For example, in Matthews 
v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth 
Circuit cited Rogers in concluding that the First 
Amendment barred a right-of-publicity claim based on 
a fictionalized, but accurate, account of an undercover 
police officer’s experiences.  Similarly, in Parks v. 
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003), the 
Sixth Circuit adopted Rogers and remanded for a 
factual determination concerning whether the use of 
the plaintiff’s name in  a song title was a “disguised 
commercial advertisement” that would remove it from 
First Amendment protection.11  And in Valentine v. 
                                                 
11
 Shortly after Parks, the Sixth Circuit decided ETW, which 
involved a right-of-publicity claim challenging an artist’s use of 
Tiger Woods’ image in a painting celebrating Woods’ golfing 
achievements.  322 F.3d at 918-19.  The Ninth Circuit below stated 
that, in view of ETW, the Sixth Circuit had been “inconsistent[]” in 
its use of the Rogers test for right-of-publicity claims.  Pet. App. 
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C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh 
Circuit construed the Florida right-of-publicity statute 
to allow the use of a person’s name except “to directly 
promote a product or service,” in order to avoid “grave 
questions” about the constitutionality of any broader 
interpretation.  Id. at 433.   
The Kentucky Supreme Court also has adopted this 
constitutional line, holding that a right-of-publicity 
claim may proceed only if the “use of a person’s name or 
likeness or other interest[s]” “is not sufficiently related 
to the underlying work, or, if the otherwise 
constitutionally-protected work is simply disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or 
services.”  Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524, 
529 (Ky. 2001) (footnote omitted; internal quotation 
marks omitted).  And the Florida Supreme Court 
recently adopted a similar rule, stating that, in light of 
First Amendment constraints, the state’s right of 
publicity does not bar the use of a name or likeness 
except to “directly promote a product or service.”  
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co. L.P., 901 So. 2d 802, 
810 (Fla. 2005); see also Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 
740 S.E.2d 622, 627 (Ga. 2013) (holding that the use of 
the plaintiff’s image on the cover of a College Girls 
Gone Wild video was actionable under Georgia’s right 
of publicity, and did not violate the defendant’s 
                                                                                                    
25a.  In fact, ETW confirmed that, in Parks, the Sixth Circuit had 
“applied the Rogers test to . . . right-of-publicity claims,” ETW, 332 
F.3d at 936 n.17.  After applying that test to the facts before it, 
ETW went on to analyze the case under a case-specific balancing of 
interests, id. at 937-38 (citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996)), and the 
transformative-use test, id. at 938, as well.   
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“freedoms of speech and press” because the image was 
used “as a  part of an advertisement”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
encourages the adoption of this test as well, explaining 
that the right of publicity is “fundamentally constrained 
by the public and constitutional interest in freedom of 
expression,” and the First Amendment ought to 
provide a defense against a right-of-publicity claim 
unless “the name or likeness is used solely to attract 
attention to a work that is not related to the identified 
person.”  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 
47 cmt. c (1995).  
2. Other Courts Engage in Case-Specific 
Balancing. 
Still other courts engage in various forms of 
balancing, weighing the expressive interests protected 
by the First Amendment against the economic 
interests protected by the right of publicity based on 
the particular facts of the case before them.  In so 
doing, none of these courts has focused on whether a 
likeness has been sufficiently “transformed.” 
Thus, in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing., Inc. v. 
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 505 F.3d 
818 (8th Cir. 2007), the Eighth Circuit held that the 
First Amendment protected fantasy baseball products 
that used the names of real players, their biographical 
data, and their performance statistics.  In reaching that 
conclusion, the court emphasized “the public value of 
information about the game of baseball and its players,” 
noted that “the information used in CBC’s fantasy 
baseball games is all readily available in the public 
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domain,” and reasoned that “it would be strange law 
that a person would not have a [F]irst [A]mendment 
right to use information that is available to everyone.”  
Id. at 823.  By contrast, it continued, “the facts in this 
case barely, if at all implicate the interests that states 
typically intend to vindicate by providing rights of 
publicity to individuals.”  Id. at 824.  Specifically, the 
court reasoned that publicity rights to one’s name and 
performance statistics were not needed to encourage 
baseball players to play the sport, and that there was 
little risk of consumer confusion, because the 
defendant’s game included all players.  Id.   
The Ninth Circuit below attempted to harmonize its 
outcome with C.B.C. on the ground that C.B.C. did not 
involve the “use[] [of] virtual likenesses of actual 
college football players,” Pet. App. 29a-30a n.12, but 
instead “merely incorporated the names along with 
performance and biographical data of actual major 
league baseball players.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  That distinction is not persuasive:  if the 
First Amendment protects the use of someone’s name 
and publicly available performance and biographical 
data, then it also protects the creation of an avatar 
reflecting publicly available information about a 
player’s appearance and playing style.  Indeed, the 
Eighth Circuit itself made clear that C.B.C.’s 
expressive interests would have been no different had 
it used actual photos of the players, see 505 F.3d at 823; 
nor would the use of photos have changed the court’s 
balancing of interests.   
The Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons likewise applied a 
case-specific balancing test to reject a right-of-publicity 
claim against the creator of parody baseball cards 
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featuring recognizable caricatures of real baseball 
players.  955 F.3d at 962-63.  The court held that the 
trading cards were expressive speech “subject to full 
First Amendment protection,” id. at 970, and 
emphasized that “[c]elebrities . . . are an important 
element of the shared communicative resources of our 
cultural domain,” and that “[r]estricting the use of 
celebrity identities restricts the communication of 
ideas,” id. at 972.  It further held that these interests 
outweighed any purported justification for the right of 
publicity.  See id. at 973-76. 
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 
2003), the Missouri Supreme Court took a markedly 
different approach, holding that speech receives First 
Amendment protection against a right-of-publicity 
claim only if its “predominant purpose . . . is to make an 
expressive comment on or about a celebrity.”  Id. at 374 
(quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  If, on the 
other hand, the speech “predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity,” it is 
subject to liability under the right of publicity, “even if 
there is some ‘expressive’ content in it.”  Id. (quotation 
marks omitted).  In devising that test, the court 
specifically rejected the transformative-use test.  Id.12   
                                                 
12
 Other courts, applying state common law or statutory exceptions 
designed to accommodate constitutional concerns, have drawn the 
line between protected and unprotected celebrity depictions by 
focusing on whether the publication is “newsworthy” or in the 
“public interest.”  See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Group, LLC, 
572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Georgia law); 
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 
793-94 (1995) (applying California law).   
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II. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle For 
Addressing the Constitutional Question. 
Plainly, the lower courts need guidance from this 
Court delineating the scope of First Amendment 
protection against a right-of-publicity claim.  This case 
presents an excellent vehicle for providing such 
guidance.  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the wide-
ranging circuit conflict on the issue—see Pet. App. 24a-
26a (noting that the Second and Sixth Circuits have 
applied the Rogers test to right-of-publicity claims and 
that the Tenth and Eighth Circuits had applied “a 
flexible case-by-case approach”).  And it also 
recognized that its decision to apply the 
transformative-use test, as opposed to the more 
speech-protective Rogers test, was outcome-
determinative.  The court acknowledged that Keller 
“would be hard-pressed to support” a claim under the 
Rogers test “absent evidence that EA explicitly misled 
consumers” into “believing that he is endorsing EA or 
its products.”  Pet. App. 23a.   
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown—issued by 
the same panel on the same day—confirmed that the 
court’s decision to apply the transformative-use test to 
right-of-publicity claims, rather than the Rogers test, 
determined the outcome in this case.  Brown concerned 
a Lanham Act claim brought by a former NFL player 
complaining about the use of his likeness in Petitioner’s 
Madden NFL game.  See Brown 724 F.3d at __, 2013 
U.S. App. LEXIS 15647, at *3.  The court applied the 
Rogers test and concluded that the First Amendment 
barred the Lanham Act claim, because “Brown’s 
likeness is artistically relevant to the games and there 
are no alleged facts to support the claim that 
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[Electronic Arts] explicitly misled consumers as to 
Brown’s involvement with the games.”  Id. at *32.  In 
such circumstances, the court held, “the public interest 
in free expression outweighs the public interest in 
avoiding consumer confusion.”  Id.  Had the court 
applied that same test to the right-of-publicity claim in 
Keller, Electronic Arts would have prevailed, just as it 
did in Brown.  
III. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Is Wrong and 
Conflicts with This Court’s First Amendment 
Jurisprudence. 
This Court’s review also is warranted because the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision—which allows a state to 
impose tort liability for non-commercial expression that 
portrays a person realistically—is both wrong and 
dangerous.  The decision cannot be squared with this 
Court’s precedents, and it threatens to chill the 
exercise of First Amendment rights. 
A. The Adopted Transformative-Use Test Does 
Not Adequately Respect First Amendment 
Rights. 
The Ninth and Third Circuits’ transformative-use 
test does not properly limit the right of publicity so 
that it becomes consistent with the First Amendment. 
The right of publicity penalizes fully protected and 
valuable speech based on its content:  the tort 
proscribes expression because it includes another’s 
name or likeness within its content.  Bartnicki v. 
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Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 521 (2001).13  This Court 
repeatedly has held, however, that “[c]ontent-based 
regulations” of speech “are presumptively invalid” and 
must be subjected to strict constitutional scrutiny. 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); 
accord, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) 
(“[A]s a general matter . . . government has no power to 
restrict expression because of . . . its content.”) 
(quotation marks omitted; bracket in original); Regan v. 
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute prohibiting accurate 
depictions of U.S. currency unless for educational, 
historic, or newsworthy purposes because those 
determinations “cannot help but be based on the 
content of the photograph and the message it 
delivers”).  
The limited exceptions to this rule consist of a few 
“historic and traditional categories” of expression, 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) 
(quotation marks omitted), which are “of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.”  R.A.V., 505 U.S. 
at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).  These include obscenity, 
defamation, fraud, fighting words, true threats, and 
speech integral to criminal conduct, see United States v. 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (collecting cases), 
and “represent ‘well-defined and narrowly limited 
                                                 
13
 See also Volokh, supra note 6 at 912 n.35 (2003) (“The right of 
publicity is clearly content-based:  It prohibits the unlicensed use 
of particular content (people’s name or likenesses).”). 
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classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem,” Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 
(quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).  This Court 
repeatedly has refused to expand these well-defined 
and historical categories or to add new categories of 
speech that the government may proscribe.  See, e.g., 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482; 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741.   
An expressive work does not fall into any of these 
traditional exceptions merely because it includes a 
portrayal of an actual person.  To the contrary, the 
right-of-publicity tort penalizing such speech is a 
modern innovation, not recognized in California itself 
until 1979.  See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 
425 (Cal. 1979).  As a leading commentator has put it, 
the right of publicity is “still a relatively raw and brash 
newcomer,” 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of 
Publicity and Privacy (2d ed. 2000). 
Because the right of publicity penalizes speech 
based on its content and does not fall into one of the 
recognized exceptions to full First Amendment 
protection, it is invalid, unless its application can be 
limited so as to avoid unconstitutional applications of 
the tort.  Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (“It is rare that a 
regulation restricting speech because of its content will 
ever be permissible.” (quoting United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)); id. 
(explaining that content-based regulations of speech 
are impermissible unless they can survive strict 
scrutiny).  The transformative-use test applied here 
does not do that. 
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To the contrary, a test that protects fanciful 
depictions of a person but imposes liability for realistic 
depictions cannot be a suitable First Amendment 
standard.  Realistic depictions within expressive works 
do not constitute a category of speech, like defamation 
or obscenity, that warrants anything less than full First 
Amendment protection against content-based 
restrictions.  Indeed, many valuable works, including 
biographies, documentaries, and historical fiction, 
include realistic portrayals or references to real people.    
A transformative-use test also does not sufficiently 
limit the right of publicity to circumstances where its 
application can survive strict scrutiny.  There is no 
compelling state interest in stamping out realistic 
portrayals of people.  According to the Ninth Circuit, 
the right of publicity serves to “‘protect[] a form of 
intellectual property [in one’s person] that society 
deems to have some social utility.’”  Pet. App. 23a 
(quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 804) (second alteration 
in original); id. at 24a (“Keller’s claim is that EA has 
appropriated, without permission and without 
providing compensation, his talent and years of hard 
work on the football field.”).  That economic interest, 
however, is not sufficiently compelling to justify 
penalizing non-commercial expression.14   
Furthermore, a person’s appearance and 
biography—here, for example, Keller’s height, weight, 
                                                 
14
 Many question the validity of the justifications for the right of 
publicity altogether.  See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 6, at 
1188; Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: 
Popular Culture & Publicity Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127, 238 
(1993); Volokh, supra note 6, at 911.   
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throwing arm, and visor—are facts in the public 
domain.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged as 
much.  See Pet. App. 30a n.12 (“It is seemingly true that 
each likeness is generated largely from publicly 
available data . . . .”).  It concluded, however, that the 
First Amendment should not protect the use of publicly 
available data to create a realistic likeness because the 
right of publicity would otherwise be “neuter[ed] . . . in 
our digital world.”  Pet. App. 30a n.12.  The court 
stated:   “If EA creates a virtual likeness of Tom Brady 
using only publicly available data . . . does EA have free 
reign to use that likeness in commercials without 
violating Brady’s right of publicity?  We think not, and 
thus must reject [the] point about the public 
availability of much of the data used . . . .”  Id.   
But no one claims that one may use publicly 
available data to insert a celebrity image in a 
commercial.  That is precisely what the Rogers test 
addresses by withholding First Amendment protection 
from false claims of celebrity endorsement.  The 
question here is whether a speaker may use publicly 
available data to create a likeness for use in non-
commercial expression.  The Ninth Circuit offers no 
reason why the First Amendment should not protect 
such use.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964); C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823 (“[T]he information used 
in CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all readily available 
in the public domain, and it would be strange law that a 
person would not have a [F]irst [A]mendment right to 
use information that is available to everyone.”).   
Indeed, the transformative-use test as applied here 
is particularly perverse, because it assumes  that the 
state has a stronger interest in penalizing accurate 
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speech than in penalizing speech that is 
“transformative.”  That has things backwards: this 
Court has repeatedly held that truthful and accurate 
expression warrants maximum First Amendment 
protection.  Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements of fact are 
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-
seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they 
cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot 
easily be repaired by counterspeech, however 
persuasive or effective.”); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (criticizing a Florida law 
making it unlawful to publicize the name of the victim 
of a sexual offense because it “punish[ed] truthful 
publication”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) 
(prohibiting false light liability even for false speech on 
“matters of public interest in the absence of proof that 
the defendant published the report with knowledge of 
its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth”). 
B. The Transformative-Use Test Will Chill 
Protected Speech Because It Is Overbroad 
and Unpredictable. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is not only wrong but 
also dangerous.  Its transformative-use test is too 
vague and unpredictable, and too susceptible to a 
court’s subjective artistic judgments, to be a workable 
First Amendment standard.   
This Court repeatedly has emphasized the 
importance of ensuring that restrictions on the content 
of speech are “well-defined.”  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468.  
Predictability is important because speakers otherwise 
will “‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if 
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the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) 
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)), 
thereby causing an “obvious chilling effect on free 
speech,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997).   
The Ninth Circuit’s transformative-use test fails 
these requirements.  If taken literally, the 
transformative-use test would allow states to subject 
biographers, filmmakers, singers, photographers, and 
other artists to tort liability whenever they include 
realistic images of, or references to, famous people.  
Yet many expressive works routinely use a real 
person’s actual name or likeness, including, for 
example, films like The Social Network, Moneyball, 42, 
and The King’s Speech; documentaries like Ken Burns’ 
critically acclaimed series on the history of baseball; 
and best-selling biographies, like those by Kitty Kelley.    
Indeed, a key element of the artistry in these works 
is the realism or accuracy of the portrayal.  For 
example, the genius of Daniel Day-Lewis’ portrayal of 
Abraham Lincoln was his ability to imitate, with great 
realism, the likeness, mannerisms, and attributes of the 
president doing what Lincoln actually did.  It would be 
disturbing if the artistic success of such a portrayal 
were precisely what would make it actionable.  Cf. 
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 
(D.N.J. 1981) (rejecting Elvis impersonator’s First 
Amendment defense to a right-of-publicity claim 
brought by Presley’s estate; “entertainment that is 
merely a copy or imitation, even if skillfully and 
accurately carried out, does not really have its own 
creative component and does not have a significant 
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value as pure entertainment” (cited with approval by 
the Third Circuit in Hart, 717 F.3d at 164)). 
To avoid absurd and dangerous outcomes, courts 
applying the transformative-use test will have little 
choice but to draw distinctions among expressive works 
reflecting their own subjective judgments about 
whether a particular work is sufficiently “artistic” or 
“creative” that it warrants protection.   Thus, the 
California Supreme Court in Comedy III determined 
that a sketch of The Three Stooges was not creative 
enough to receive First Amendment protection, but an 
Andy Warhol portrait of Marilyn Monroe did deserve 
such protection because it presented “a form of ironic 
social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity 
itself.”  21 P.3d at 811.  Courts should not place 
themselves in the role of art critic and make First 
Amendment freedoms turn on subjective judgments of 
this kind.  Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be 
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest 
and most obvious limits.”).  
A legal regime turning on such “subtle” distinctions 
among expressive works, Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 812, is 
inherently unpredictable and will chill expression.  
Hart presents a good example of such unpredictability.  
The Third Circuit concluded that an avatar portraying 
a college football player in an animated and interactive 
fictional college football game was actionable because 
the player’s image was not sufficiently transformed; 
yet, in the same decision, the court held that placement, 
in a later edition of the same video game, of an actual 
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photograph of the player in a montage of other 
photographs of Rutgers football players was not 
actionable, because the context made the depiction 
transformative.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 169-70 (citing ETW, 
332 F.3d at 938).   
It is hard rationally to reconcile these two rulings.15  
According to the dissent in Hart, the majority simply 
treated video games as less worthy of constitutional 
protection than other types of expressive works, such 
as photomontages—despite this Court’s clear 
preclusion of such a First Amendment double standard 
in Brown.  Id. at 174 (Ambro, J., dissenting) 
(expressing concern about “a medium-specific metric 
that provides less protection to video games than other 
expressive works”).  The majority did not respond to 
Judge Ambro’s concerns at all, except to claim that it 
faithfully followed Brown’s admonition that video 
games “enjoy the full force of First Amendment 
protections.”  Id. at 148 (majority opinion). 
Similarly, Judge Thomas warned that the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding “jeopardizes the creative use of 
                                                 
15
 The Ninth Circuit’s applications of the transformative-use test 
prior to the case also demonstrate the test’s unpredictability.  In 
Hilton, the court held that the use of Paris Hilton’s face super-
imposed over a cartoon body in a greeting card parody of the 
television show The Simple Life was not transformative because 
“the basic setting is the same [as in the show]: we see Paris Hilton, 
born to privilege, working as a waitress.”  599 F.3d at 911.  Yet in 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001), 
the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that a magazine’s use of an image 
of Dustin Hoffman from “Tootsie” was transformative because 
“Hoffman’s body was eliminated and a new, differently clothed 
body was substituted in its place.”  Id. at 1184 n.2.   
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historic figures in motion pictures, books, and sound 
recordings.”  Pet. App. 43a (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
The majority responded that its holding was not so 
broad, because its transformative-use test allows a 
court to consider “whether a likely purchaser’s primary 
motivation is to buy a reproduction of the celebrity, or 
to buy the expressive work of that artist.  Certainly 
this leaves room for distinguishing this case . . . and 
cases involving other kinds of expressive works.”  Id. at 
19a-20a n.10 (majority opinion) (internal quotation 
marks omitted; citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
This reasoning bears no relation to this Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  First, it implies the type of 
medium-specific metric this Court rejected in Brown, 
131 S. Ct. at 2733.  Second, it requires speakers to guess 
what a court might guess to be “a likely purchaser’s 
primary motivation,” Pet. App. 19a n.10, in buying an 
expressive work.  Such a standard might “leave[] room 
for [courts to] distinguish[]” cases, id. at 20a n.10, but it 
leaves no “breathing room for protected speech,” 
Illinois ex. rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 
538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003).  Speakers’ potential liability 
cannot possibly depend upon whether they guess 
correctly about the motivations of people they do not 
know and cannot control.  
Speakers need certainty about whether their speech 
will subject them to liability, or they will self-censor.  
The transformative-use test cannot provide that 
predictability. 
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C. Case-Specific Balancing Is Equally 
Problematic. 
Decisions calling for ad hoc balancing of First 
Amendment interests and the interests protected by 
the right of publicity present just as many 
constitutional problems.  See, e.g., Cardtoons,  95 F.3d 
at 973-76; C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824.  This Court has 
rejected any notion of a “free-floating test for First 
Amendment coverage.”  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470; see 
also Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.  As this Court has 
explained, “[t]he First Amendment's guarantee of free 
speech does not extend only to categories of speech 
that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs 
and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a 
judgment by the American people that the benefits of 
its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. 
Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that 
judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not 
worth it.”  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470. 
Moreover, here, ad hoc balancing requires a court to 
weigh apples against oranges.  There is no principled 
way to determine, case by case, whether the economic 
interest of a person in preventing a given portrayal 
outweighs the social value of a given expressive work.  
The two interests being compared are too different to 
enable judges to reach consistent and predictable 
results. 
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D. The Rogers Test Confines the Right of 
Publicity to Circumstances Where Its 
Application Does Not Violate the First 
Amendment. 
Unlike the transformative-use test and case-by-case 
balancing, the Rogers test confines the right-of-
publicity tort to situations in which speakers have used 
a depiction of, or reference to, a celebrity to sell 
something—either by falsely claiming a celebrity 
commercial endorsement or by including a celebrity 
image in a publication gratuitously, just to attract 
attention.   
Confined to these circumstances, the right of 
publicity does not raise constitutional concerns.  Speech 
that falsely claims a commercial endorsement is akin to 
the category of fraudulent speech that the government 
has long regulated without any First Amendment 
concerns.  See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
(1976) (noting that fraudulent speech generally falls 
outside the protections of the First Amendment).  And 
the gratuitous use of a celebrity’s image to attract 
attention, unrelated to any expressive content in the 
work, likewise falls outside First Amendment 
protection altogether.  Thus confined, the right-of-
publicity tort raises little constitutional concern.    
* * * 
This Court’s review is sorely needed.  Because so 
many expressive works are distributed nationwide, the 
rule created by the Ninth and Third Circuits effectively 
has set the constitutional rule for the rest of the 
country.  But that rule makes no sense constitutionally.  
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Moreover, the rule is so vague and unpredictable in its 
application that speakers will not know whether their 
speech is constitutionally protected or tortious.  Given 
the potentially ruinous financial consequences of 
guessing wrong (here, Respondent seeks hundreds of 
millions of dollars on behalf of a class that could have 
thousands of members), speakers will go too far in their 
self-censorship.  Unless and until this Court intervenes, 
a great deal of valuable and protected expression will 
be chilled.   
CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant the petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 
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In re NCAA STUDENT–ATHLETE NAME & 
LIKENESS LICENSING LITIGATION, 
Samuel Michael Keller; Edward C. O’bannon, Jr.; 
Byron Bishop; Michael Anderson; Danny Wimprine; 
Ishmael Thrower; Craig Newsome; Damien Rhodes; 
Samuel Jacobson, Plaintiffs–Appellees, 
v. 
Electronic Arts Inc., Defendant–Appellant, 
and 
National Collegiate Athletic Association; Collegiate 
Licensing Company, Defendants. 
No. 10–15387. 
Argued and Submitted Feb. 15, 2011. 
Submission Vacated Feb. 18, 2011. 
Argued and Resubmitted July 13, 2012. 
Filed July 31, 2013. 
Gregory L. Cutner and Robert J. Wierenga, Schiff 
Harden, LLP, Ann Arbor, MI; Rocky N. Unruh, Schiff 
Hardin, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Amicus Curiae 
National Collegiate Athletic Association.* 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California, Claudia A. Wilken, 
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 4:09–cv–01967–CW. 
                                                            
* The NCAA’s motion to file its amicus brief is GRANTED. 
2a 
Before: SIDNEY R. THOMAS and JAY S. BYBEE, 
Circuit Judges, and GORDON J. QUIST, Senior Dis-
trict Judge.** 
 
OPINION 
BYBEE, Circuit Judge: 
Video games are entitled to the full protections of 
the First Amendment, because “[l]ike the protected 
books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video 
games communicate ideas—and even social 
messages—through many familiar literary devices 
(such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and 
through features distinctive to the medium (such as the 
player’s interaction with the virtual world).” Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S. Ct. 
2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011).1  Such rights are 
not absolute, and states may recognize the right of 
publicity to a degree consistent with the First 
                                                            
** The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by 
designation. 
1 In Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 09–56675, slip op. at 9–10 
(9th Cir. July 31, 2013), we noted that “there may be some work 
referred to as a ‘video game’ (or referred to as a ‘book,’ ‘play,’ or 
‘movie’ for that matter) that does not contain enough of the 
elements contemplated by the Supreme Court [in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association] to warrant First 
Amendment protection as an expressive work,” but asserted that 
“[e]ven if there is a line to be drawn between expressive video 
games and non-expressive video games, and even if courts should 
at some point be drawing that line, we have no need to draw that 
line here.” The same holds true in this case. 
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Amendment. Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 
433 U.S. 562, 574–75, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 
(1977). In this case, we must balance the right of 
publicity of a former college football player against the 
asserted First Amendment right of a video game 
developer to use his likeness in its expressive works. 
The district court concluded that the game 
developer, Electronic Arts (“EA”), had no First 
Amendment defense against the right-of-publicity 
claims of the football player, Samuel Keller. We affirm. 
Under the “transformative use” test developed by the 
California Supreme Court, EA’s use does not qualify 
for First Amendment protection as a matter of law 
because it literally recreates Keller in the very setting 
in which he has achieved renown. The other First 
Amendment defenses asserted by EA do not defeat 
Keller’s claims either. 
I 
Samuel Keller was the starting quarterback for 
Arizona State University in 2005 before he transferred 
to the University of Nebraska, where he played during 
the 2007 season. EA is the producer of the NCAA 
Football series of video games, which allow users to 
control avatars representing college football players as 
those avatars participate in simulated games. In NCAA 
Football, EA seeks to replicate each school’s entire 
team as accurately as possible. Every real football 
player on each team included in the game has a 
corresponding avatar in the game with the player’s 
actual jersey number and virtually identical height, 
weight, build, skin tone, hair color, and home state. EA 
attempts to match any unique, highly identifiable 
4a 
playing behaviors by sending detailed questionnaires to 
team equipment managers. Additionally, EA creates 
realistic virtual versions of actual stadiums; populates 
them with the virtual athletes, coaches, cheerleaders, 
and fans realistically rendered by EA’s graphic artists; 
and incorporates realistic sounds such as the crunch of 
the players’ pads and the roar of the crowd. 
EA’s game differs from reality in that EA omits the 
players’ names on their jerseys and assigns each player 
a home town that is different from the actual player’s 
home town. However, users of the video game may 
upload rosters of names obtained from third parties so 
that the names do appear on the jerseys. In such cases, 
EA allows images from the game containing athletes’ 
real names to be posted on its website by users. Users 
can further alter reality by entering “Dynasty” mode, 
where the user assumes a head coach’s responsibilities 
for a college program for up to thirty seasons, including 
recruiting players from a randomly generated pool of 
high school athletes, or “Campus Legend” mode, where 
the user controls a virtual player from high school 
through college, making choices relating to practices, 
academics, and social life. 
In the 2005 edition of the game, the virtual starting 
quarterback for Arizona State wears number 9, as did 
Keller, and has the same height, weight, skin tone, hair 
color, hair style, handedness, home state, play style 
(pocket passer), visor preference, facial features, and 
school year as Keller. In the 2008 edition, the virtual 
quarterback for Nebraska has these same 
characteristics, though the jersey number does not 
5a 
match, presumably because Keller changed his number 
right before the season started. 
Objecting to this use of his likeness, Keller filed a 
putative class-action complaint in the Northern District 
of California asserting, as relevant on appeal, that EA 
violated his right of publicity under California Civil 
Code § 3344 and California common law.2  EA moved to 
strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against 
public participation (“SLAPP”) under California’s 
anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, and 
the district court denied the motion. We have 
jurisdiction over EA’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024–26 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 3 
II 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is designed to 
discourage suits that “masquerade as ordinary lawsuits 
but are brought to deter common citizens from 
                                                            
2 There are actually nine named plaintiffs, all former National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) football or basketball 
players: Keller, Edward O’Bannon, Jr. (UCLA), Byron Bishop 
(University of North Carolina), Michael Anderson (University of 
Memphis), Danny Wimprine (University of Memphis), Ishmael 
Thrower (Arizona State University), Craig Newsome (Arizona 
State University), Damien Rhodes (Syracuse University), and 
Samuel Jacobson (University of Minnesota). EA’s NCAA 
basketball games are also implicated in this appeal. Because the 
issues are the same for each plaintiff, all of the claims are 
addressed through our discussion of Keller and NCAA Football. 
3 We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to strike 
under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. 
Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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exercising their political or legal rights or to punish 
them for doing so.”  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1024 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The statute provides: 
A cause of action against a person arising from 
any act of that person in furtherance of the 
person’s right of petition or free speech under 
the United States Constitution or the California 
Constitution in connection with a public issue 
shall be subject to a special motion to strike, 
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has 
established that there is a probability that the 
plaintiff will prevail on the claim. 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). We have 
determined that the anti-SLAPP statute is available in 
federal court. Thomas v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., 400 F.3d 
1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
We evaluate an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. 
First, the defendant must “make a prima facie showing 
that the plaintiff’s suit arises from an act by the 
defendant made in connection with a public issue in 
furtherance of the defendant’s right to free speech 
under the United States or California Constitution.” 
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1024. Keller does not contest that 
EA has made this threshold showing. Indeed, there is 
no question that “video games qualify for First 
Amendment protection,” Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2733, or that Keller’s suit arises from EA’s 
production and distribution of NCAA Football in 
furtherance of EA’s protected right to express itself 
through video games. 
7a 
Second, we must evaluate whether the plaintiff has 
“establish[ed] a reasonable probability that the plaintiff 
will prevail on his or her . . . claim.” Batzel, 333 F.3d at 
1024. “The plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a prima 
facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if 
the evidence submitted by plaintiff is credited.” 
Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 840 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
statute “subjects to potential dismissal only those 
actions in which the plaintiff cannot state and 
substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” Navellier v. 
Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703, 
711 (Cal. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). EA 
did not contest before the district court and does not 
contest here that Keller has stated a right-of-publicity 
claim under California common and statutory law. 4 
Instead, EA raises four affirmative defenses derived 
from the First Amendment: the “transformative use” 
test, the Rogers test, the “public interest” test, and the 
“public affairs” exemption. EA argues that, in light of 
these defenses, it is not reasonably probable that Keller 
                                                            
4  The elements of a right-of-publicity claim under California 
common law are: “(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; 
(2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s 
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) 
resulting injury.”   Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal.App.4th 
664, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 111 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The same claim under California Civil Code § 3344 requires a 
plaintiff to prove “all the elements of the common law cause of 
action” plus “a knowing use by the defendant as well as a direct 
connection between the alleged use and the commercial purpose.” 
Id. 
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will prevail on his right-of-publicity claim. This appeal 
therefore centers on the applicability of these defenses. 
We take each one in turn.5 
A 
The California Supreme Court formulated the 
transformative use defense in Comedy III Productions, 
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387, 106 
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). The defense is 
“a balancing test between the First Amendment and 
the right of publicity based on whether the work in 
question adds significant creative elements so as to be 
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity 
likeness or imitation.” Id. at 799. The California 
Supreme Court explained that “when a work contains 
significant transformative elements, it is not only 
especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but 
it is also less likely to interfere with the economic 
interest protected by the right of publicity.” Id. at 808. 
The court rejected the wholesale importation of the 
copyright “fair use” defense into right-of-publicity 
claims, but recognized that some aspects of that 
defense are “particularly pertinent.” Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 
107; see also SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 
709 F.3d 1273, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the 
“fair use” defense codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
Comedy III gives us at least five factors to consider 
in determining whether a work is sufficiently 
                                                            
5 Just as we did in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, we reserve the 
question of whether the First Amendment furnishes a defense 
other than those the parties raise. 599 F.3d 894, 909 n.11 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
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transformative to obtain First Amendment protection. 
See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and 
Privacy § 8:72 (2d ed. 2012). First, if “the celebrity 
likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an 
original work is synthesized,” it is more likely to be 
transformative than if “the depiction or imitation of the 
celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in 
question.” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 
809. Second, the work is protected if it is “primarily the 
defendant’s own expression”—as long as that 
expression is “something other than the likeness of the 
celebrity.” Id. This factor requires an examination of 
whether a likely purchaser’s primary motivation is to 
buy a reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy the 
expressive work of that artist. McCarthy, supra, § 8:72. 
Third, to avoid making judgments concerning “the 
quality of the artistic contribution,” a court should 
conduct an inquiry “more quantitative than qualitative” 
and ask “whether the literal and imitative or the 
creative elements predominate in the work.” Comedy 
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 809. Fourth, the 
California Supreme Court indicated that “a subsidiary 
inquiry” would be useful in close cases: whether “the 
marketability and economic value of the challenged 
work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity 
depicted.” Id. at 810. Lastly, the court indicated that 
“when an artist’s skill and talent is manifestly 
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a 
conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to 
commercially exploit his or her fame,” the work is not 
transformative. Id. 
10a 
We have explained that “[o]nly if [a defendant] is 
entitled to the [transformative] defense as a matter of 
law can it prevail on its motion to strike,” because the 
California Supreme Court “envisioned the application 
of the defense as a question of fact.” Hilton, 599 F.3d at 
910. As a result, EA “is only entitled to the defense as a 
matter of law if no trier of fact could reasonably 
conclude that the [game] [i]s not transformative.” Id. 
California courts have applied the transformative 
use test in relevant situations in four cases. First, in 
Comedy III itself, the California Supreme Court 
applied the test to T-shirts and lithographs bearing a 
likeness of The Three Stooges and concluded that it 
could “discern no significant transformative or creative 
contribution.” Id. at 811. The court reasoned that the 
artist’s “undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to 
the overall goal of creating literal, conventional 
depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit their 
fame.” Id. “[W]ere we to decide that [the artist’s] 
depictions were protected by the First Amendment,” 
the court continued, “we cannot perceive how the right 
of publicity would remain a viable right other than in 
cases of falsified celebrity endorsements.” Id. 
Second, in Winter v. DC Comics, the California 
Supreme Court applied the test to comic books 
containing characters Johnny and Edgar Autumn, 
“depicted as villainous half-worm, half-human 
offspring” but evoking two famous brothers, rockers 
Johnny and Edgar Winter. 30 Cal.4th 881, 134 
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003). The court 
held that “the comic books are transformative and 
entitled to First Amendment protection.” Id. at 480. It 
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reasoned that the comic books “are not just 
conventional depictions of plaintiffs but contain 
significant expressive content other than plaintiffs’ 
mere likenesses.” Id. at 479. “To the extent the 
drawings of the Autumn brothers resemble plaintiffs at 
all, they are distorted for purposes of lampoon, parody, 
or caricature.” Id. Importantly, the court relied on the 
fact that the brothers “are but cartoon characters . . . in 
a larger story, which is itself quite expressive.” Id. 
Third, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the 
California Court of Appeal applied the transformative 
use test to a video game in which the user controls the 
dancing of “Ulala,” a reporter from outer space 
allegedly based on singer Kierin Kirby, whose 
“‘signature’ lyrical expression . . . is ‘ooh la la.’” 144 
Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607, 609–10 (Ct. App. 
2006). The court held that “Ulala is more than a mere 
likeness or literal depiction of Kirby,” pointing to 
Ulala’s “extremely tall, slender computer-generated 
physique,” her “hairstyle and primary costume,” her 
dance moves, and her role as “a space-age reporter in 
the 25th century,” all of which were “unlike any public 
depiction of Kirby.” Id. at 616. “As in Winter, Ulala is a 
‘fanciful, creative character’ who exists in the context of 
a unique and expressive video game.”  Id. at 618. 
Finally, in No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 
the California Court of Appeal addressed Activision’s 
Band Hero video game. 192 Cal.App.4th 1018, 122 
Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 400 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review 
denied, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 6100 (Cal. June 8, 2011) (No. 
B223996). In Band Hero, users simulate performing in 
a rock band in time with popular songs. Id. at 401. 
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Users choose from a number of avatars, some of which 
represent actual rock stars, including the members of 
the rock band No Doubt. Id. at 401. Activision licensed 
No Doubt’s likeness, but allegedly exceeded the scope 
of the license by permitting users to manipulate the No 
Doubt avatars to play any song in the game, solo or 
with members of other bands, and even to alter the 
avatars’ voices. Id. at 402. The court held that No 
Doubt’s right of publicity prevailed despite Activision’s 
First Amendment defense because the game was not 
“transformative” under the Comedy III test. It 
reasoned that the video game characters were “literal 
recreations of the band members,” doing “the same 
activity by which the band achieved and maintains its 
fame.” Id. at 411. According to the court, the fact “that 
the avatars appear in the context of a videogame that 
contains many other creative elements[] does not 
transform the avatars into anything other than exact 
depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly what 
they do as celebrities.” Id. The court concluded that 
“the expressive elements of the game remain 
manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating 
a conventional portrait of No Doubt so as to 
commercially exploit its fame.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
We have also had occasion to apply the 
transformative use test. In Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 
we applied the test to a birthday card depicting Paris 
Hilton in a manner reminiscent of an episode of Hilton’s 
reality show The Simple Life. 599 F.3d at 899. We 
observed some differences between the episode and the 
card, but noted that “the basic setting is the same: we 
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see Paris Hilton, born to privilege, working as a 
waitress.” Id. at 911. We reasoned that “[w]hen we 
compare Hallmark’s card to the video game in Kirby, 
which transported a 1990s singer (catchphrases and all) 
into the 25th century and transmogrified her into a 
space-age reporter, . . . the card falls far short of the 
level of new expression added in the video game.” Id. 
As a result, we concluded that “there is enough doubt 
as to whether Hallmark’s card is transformative under 
our case law that we cannot say Hallmark is entitled to 
the defense as a matter of law.” Id.6 
With these cases in mind as guidance, we conclude 
that EA’s use of Keller’s likeness does not contain 
significant transformative elements such that EA is 
entitled to the defense as a matter of law. The facts of 
No Doubt are very similar to those here. EA is alleged 
to have replicated Keller’s physical characteristics in 
NCAA Football, just as the members of No Doubt are 
realistically portrayed in Band Hero. Here, as in Band 
Hero, users manipulate the characters in the 
performance of the same activity for which they are 
known in real life—playing football in this case, and 
                                                            
6  We also briefly addressed the transformative use test in a 
footnote in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 
(9th Cir. 2001). We indicated that if we had considered the test, we 
would have concluded that an image of Dustin Hoffman from 
“Tootsie” that had been altered to make it appear like he was 
wearing fashions from a decade later “contained ‘significant 
transformative elements.’” Id. at 1184 n.2; 1182–83. “Hoffman’s 
body was eliminated and a new, differently clothed body was 
substituted in its place. In fact, the entire theory of Hoffman’s case 
rests on his allegation that the photograph is not a ‘true’ or ‘literal’ 
depiction of him, but a false portrayal.” Id. at 1184 n.2. 
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performing in a rock band in Band Hero. The context in 
which the activity occurs is also similarly realistic—real 
venues in Band Hero and realistic depictions of actual 
football stadiums in NCAA Football. As the district 
court found, Keller is represented as “what he was: the 
starting quarterback for Arizona State” and Nebraska, 
and “the game’s setting is identical to where the public 
found [Keller] during his collegiate career: on the 
football field.” Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09–1967 
CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
EA argues that the district court erred in focusing 
primarily on Keller’s likeness and ignoring the 
transformative elements of the game as a whole. Judge 
Thomas, our dissenting colleague, suggests the same. 
See Dissent at 34. We are unable to say that there was 
any error, particularly in light of No Doubt, which 
reasoned much the same as the district court in this 
case: “that the avatars appear in the context of a 
videogame that contains many other creative 
elements[] does not transform the avatars into 
anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s 
members doing exactly what they do as 
celebrities.”  No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 411.7 EA 
                                                            
7 Judge Thomas argues that the “sheer number of virtual actors,” 
the absence of “any evidence as to the personal marketing power 
of Sam Keller,” and the relative anonymity of each individual 
player in NCAA Football as compared to the public figures in 
other California right-of publicity cases all mitigate in favor of 
finding that the EA’s First Amendment rights outweigh Keller’s 
right of publicity. See Dissent at 37–40. These facts are not 
irrelevant to the analysis—they all can be considered in the 
framework of the five considerations from Comedy III laid out 
above—but the fact is that EA elected to use avatars that mimic 
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suggests that the fact that NCAA Football users can 
alter the characteristics of the avatars in the game is 
significant. Again, our dissenting colleague agrees. See 
Dissent at 36–37. In No Doubt, the California Court of 
Appeal noted that Band Hero “d[id] not permit players 
to alter the No Doubt avatars in any respect.” Id. at 
410. The court went on to say that the No Doubt 
avatars “remain at all times immutable images of the 
real celebrity musicians, in stark contrast to the 
‘fanciful, creative characters’ in Winter and Kirby.” Id. 
The court explained further: 
[I]t is the differences between Kirby and the 
instant case . . . which are determinative. In 
Kirby, the pop singer was portrayed as an 
entirely new character—the space-age news 
reporter Ulala. In Band Hero, by contrast, no 
matter what else occurs in the game during the 
depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the avatars 
perform rock songs, the same activity by which 
the band achieved and maintains its fame. 
Moreover, the avatars perform those songs as 
literal recreations of the band members. That 
the avatars can be manipulated to perform at 
fanciful venues including outer space or to sing 
songs the real band would object to singing, or 
that the avatars appear in the context of a 
                                                                                                                          
real college football players for a reason. If EA did not think there 
was value in having an avatar designed to mimic each individual 
player, it would not go to the lengths it does to achieve realism in 
this regard. Having chosen to use the players’ likenesses, EA 
cannot now hide behind the numerosity of its potential offenses or 
the alleged unimportance of any one individual player. 
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videogame that contains many other creative 
elements, does not transform the avatars into 
anything other than exact depictions of No 
Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as 
celebrities. 
Id. at 410–11. Judge Thomas says that “[t]he Court of 
Appeal cited character immutability as a chief factor 
distinguishing [No Doubt] from Winter and Kirby.” 
Dissent at 37. Though No Doubt certainly mentioned 
the immutability of the avatars, we do not read the 
California Court of Appeal’s decision as turning on the 
inability of users to alter the avatars. The key contrast 
with Winter and Kirby was that in those games the 
public figures were transformed into “fanciful, creative 
characters” or “portrayed as . . . entirely new 
character[s].” No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 410. On this 
front, our case is clearly aligned with No Doubt, not 
with Winter and Kirby. We believe No Doubt offers a 
persuasive precedent that cannot be materially 
distinguished from Keller’s case.8,9 
                                                            
8 EA further argues that No Doubt is distinguishable because the 
video game company in that case entered into a license agreement 
which it allegedly breached. However, the California Court of 
Appeal did not rely on breach of contract in its analysis of whether 
the game was transformative. 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 412 n.7. Keller 
asserts here that EA contracted away its First Amendment rights 
in a licensing agreement with the NCAA that purportedly 
prohibited the use of athlete likenesses. However, in light of our 
conclusion that EA is not entitled to a First Amendment defense 
as a matter of law, we need not reach this issue and leave it for the 
district court to address in the first instance on remand should the 
finder of fact determine in post-SLAPP proceedings that EA’s use 
is transformative. 
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The Third Circuit came to the same conclusion in 
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 
2013). In Hart, EA faced a materially identical 
challenge under New Jersey right-of-publicity law, 
brought by former Rutgers quarterback Ryan Hart. 
See id. at 163 n.28 (“Keller is simply [Hart ] incarnated 
in California.”). Though the Third Circuit was tasked 
with interpreting New Jersey law, the court looked to 
the transformative use test developed in California. See 
id. at 158 n.23 (noting that the right-of-publicity laws 
are “strikingly similar . . . and protect similar interests” 
in New Jersey and California, and that “consequently 
[there is] no issue in applying balancing tests developed 
in California to New Jersey”); see also id. at 165 
(holding that “the Transformative Use Test is the 
proper analytical framework to apply to cases such as 
the one at bar”). Applying the test, the court held that 
“the NCAA Football . . . games at issue . . . do not 
sufficiently transform [Hart]’s identity to escape the 
                                                                                                                          
9  In dissent, Judge Thomas suggests that this case is 
distinguishable from other right-to-publicity cases because “an 
individual college athlete’s right of publicity is extraordinarily 
circumscribed and, in practical reality, nonexistent” because 
“NCAA rules prohibit athletes from benefitting economically from 
any success on the field.” Dissent at 41. Judge Thomas 
commendably addresses the fairness of this structure, see Dissent 
at 41–42 n.5, but setting fairness aside, the fact is that college 
athletes are not indefinitely bound by NCAA rules. Once an 
athlete graduates from college, for instance, the athlete can 
capitalize on his success on the field during college in any number 
of ways. EA’s use of a college athlete’s likeness interferes with the 
athlete’s right to capitalize on his athletic success once he is 
beyond the dominion of NCAA rule. 
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right of publicity claim,” reversing the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment to EA. Id. at 170. 
As we have, the Third Circuit considered the 
potentially transformative nature of the game as a 
whole, id. at 166, 169, and the user’s ability to alter 
avatar characteristics, id. at 166–68. Asserting that 
“the lack of transformative context is even more 
pronounced here than in No Doubt,” id. at 166, and that 
“the ability to modify the avatar counts for little where 
the appeal of the game lies in users’ ability to play as, or 
alongside [,] their preferred players or team,” id. at 168 
(internal quotation marks omitted), the Third Circuit 
agreed with us that these changes do not render the 
NCAA Football games sufficiently transformative to 
defeat a right-of-publicity claim. 
Judge Ambro dissented in Hart, concluding that 
“the creative components of NCAA Football contain 
sufficient expressive transformation to merit First 
Amendment protection.” Id. at 175 (Ambro, J., 
dissenting). But in critiquing the majority opinion, 
Judge Ambro disregarded No Doubt and Kirby because 
“they were not decided by the architect of the 
Transformative Use Test, the Supreme Court of 
California.” Id. at 172 n.4. He thus “d [id] not attempt to 
explain or distinguish the[se cases’] holdings except to 
note that [he] believe[s] No Doubt, which focused on 
individual depictions rather than the work in its 
entirety, was wrongly decided in light of the prior 
precedent in Comedy III and Winter.” Id. We recognize 
that we are bound only by the decisions of a state’s 
highest court and not by decisions of the state’s 
intermediate appellate court when considering statelaw 
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issues sitting in diversity jurisdiction. See In re 
Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Nonetheless, where there is no binding precedent from 
the state’s highest court, we “must predict how the 
highest state court would decide the issue using 
intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from 
other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and 
restatements as guidance.” Id. at 1239 (emphasis 
added). As stated above, we believe No Doubt in 
particular provides persuasive guidance. We do not 
believe No Doubt to be inconsistent with the California 
Supreme Court’s relevant decisions, and we will not 
disregard a well-reasoned decision from a state’s 
intermediate appellate court in this context. Like the 
majority in Hart, we rely substantially on No Doubt, 
and believe we are correct to do so. 
Given that NCAA Football realistically portrays 
college football players in the context of college football 
games, the district court was correct in concluding that 
EA cannot prevail as a matter of law based on the 
transformative use defense at the anti-SLAPP stage. 
Cf. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 910–11.10 
                                                            
10 Judge Thomas asserts that “[t]he logical consequence of the 
majority view is that all realistic depictions of actual persons, no 
matter how incidental, are protected by a state law right of 
publicity regardless of the creative context,” “jeopardiz[ing] the 
creative use of historic figures in motion pictures, books, and 
sound recordings.” Dissent at 43. We reject the notion that our 
holding has such broad consequences. As discussed above, one of 
the factors identified in Comedy III “requires an examination of 
whether a likely purchaser’s primary motivation is to buy a 
reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy the expressive work of that 
artist.” McCarthy, supra, § 8:72; see Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 
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EA urges us to adopt for right-of-publicity claims 
the broader First Amendment defense that we have 
previously adopted in the context of false endorsement 
claims under the Lanham Act: the Rogers test.11 See 
Brown v. Elec. Arts, No. 09–56675, slip op. at 5–6 
(applying the Rogers test to a Lanham Act claim 
brought by former NFL player Jim Brown relating to 
the use of his likeness in EA’s Madden NFL video 
games). 
Rogers v. Grimaldi is a landmark Second Circuit 
case balancing First Amendment rights against claims 
under the Lanham Act. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.1989). The 
case involved a suit brought by the famous performer 
Ginger Rogers against the producers and distributors 
of Ginger and Fred, a movie about two fictional Italian 
cabaret performers who imitated Rogers and her 
frequent performing partner Fred Astaire. Id. at 
996–97. Rogers alleged both a violation of the Lanham 
Act for creating the false impression that she endorsed 
the film and infringement of her common law right of 
publicity. Id. at 997. 
                                                                                                                          
126, 21 P.3d at 809. Certainly this leaves room for distinguishing 
between this case-where we have emphasized EA’s primary 
emphasis on reproducing reality-and cases involving other kinds of 
expressive works. 
11 Keller argues that EA never asked the district court to apply 
Rogers and has therefore waived the issue on appeal. Although it 
could have been more explicit, EA’s anti-SLAPP motion did cite 
Rogers and argue that Keller had not alleged that his likeness was 
“wholly unrelated” to the content of the video game or a “disguised 
commercial advertisement,” the two prongs of the Rogers test. 
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The Rogers court recognized that “[m]ovies, plays, 
books, and songs are all indisputably works of artistic 
expression and deserve protection,” but that “[t]he 
purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of peas, 
has a right not to be misled as to the source of the 
product.” Id. “Consumers of artistic works thus have a 
dual interest: They have an interest in not being misled 
and they also have an interest in enjoying the results of 
the author’s freedom of expression.” Id. at 998. The 
Rogers court determined that titles of artistic or 
literary works were less likely to be misleading than 
“the names of ordinary commercial products,” and thus 
that Lanham Act protections applied with less rigor 
when considering titles of artistic or literary works 
than when considering ordinary products. Id. at 
999–1000. The court concluded that “in general the Act 
should be construed to apply to artistic works only 
where the public interest in avoiding consumer 
confusion outweighs the public interest in free 
expression.” Id. at 999. The court therefore held: 
In the context of allegedly misleading titles 
using a celebrity’s name, that balance will 
normally not support application of the 
[Lanham] Act unless the title has no artistic 
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, 
or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the 
title explicitly misleads as to the source or the 
content of the work.   
Id. 
We first endorsed the Rogers test for Lanham Act 
claims involving artistic or expressive works in Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 
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2002). We agreed that, in the context of artistic and 
literary titles, “[c]onsumers expect a title to 
communicate a message about the book or movie, but 
they do not expect it to identify the publisher or 
producer,” and “adopt[ed] the Rogers standard as our 
own.” Id. Then, in E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. 
Rock Star Videos, Inc., we considered a claim by a strip 
club owner that video game maker Rock Star 
incorporated its club logo into the game’s virtual 
depiction of East Los Angeles, violating the club’s 
trademark right to that logo. 547 F.3d 1095, 1096–98 
(9th Cir. 2008). We held that Rock Star’s use of the logo 
and trade dress was protected by the First 
Amendment and that it therefore could not be held 
liable under the Lanham Act.   Id. at 1099–1101. In so 
doing, we extended the Rogers test slightly, noting 
that “[a]lthough this test traditionally applies to uses of 
a trademark in the title of an artistic work, there is no 
principled reason why it ought not also apply to the use 
of a trademark in the body of the work.” Id. at 1099. 
In this case, EA argues that we should extend this 
test, created to evaluate Lanham Act claims, to apply 
to right-of-publicity claims because it is “less prone to 
misinterpretation” and “more protective of free 
expression” than the transformative use defense. 
Although we acknowledge that there is some overlap 
between the transformative use test formulated by the 
California Supreme Court and the Rogers test, we 
disagree that the Rogers test should be imported 
wholesale for right-of-publicity claims. Our conclusion 
on this point is consistent with the Third Circuit’s 
rejection of EA’s identical argument in Hart. See Hart, 
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717 F.3d at 154–58. As the history and development of 
the Rogers test makes clear, it was designed to protect 
consumers from the risk of consumer confusion—the 
hallmark element of a Lanham Act claim. See Cairns v. 
Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002). 
The right of publicity, on the other hand, does not 
primarily seek to prevent consumer confusion. See 
Hart, 717 F.3d at 158 (“[T]he right of publicity does not 
implicate the potential for consumer confusion. . . .”). 
Rather, it primarily “protects a form of intellectual 
property [in one’s person] that society deems to have 
some social utility.” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 
21 P.3d at 804. As the California Supreme Court has 
explained: 
Often considerable money, time and energy are 
needed to develop one’s prominence in a particular 
field. Years of labor may be required before one’s 
skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently 
developed to permit an economic return through 
some medium of commercial promotion. For some, 
the investment may eventually create considerable 
commercial value in one’s identity. 
Id. at 804–05 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
The right of publicity protects the celebrity, not the 
consumer. Keller’s publicity claim is not founded on an 
allegation that consumers are being illegally misled into 
believing that he is endorsing EA or its products. 
Indeed, he would be hard-pressed to support such an 
allegation absent evidence that EA explicitly misled 
consumers into holding such a belief. See Brown v. Elec. 
Arts, No. 09–56675, slip op. at 23 (holding under the 
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Rogers test that, since “Brown’s likeness is artistically 
relevant to the [Madden NFL] games and there are no 
alleged facts to support the claim that EA explicitly 
misled consumers as to Brown’s involvement with the 
games,” “the public interest in free expression 
outweighs the public interest in avoiding consumer 
confusion”). Instead, Keller’s claim is that EA has 
appropriated, without permission and without 
providing compensation, his talent and years of hard 
work on the football field. The reasoning of the Rogers 
and Mattel courts—that artistic and literary works 
should be protected unless they explicitly mislead 
consumers—is simply not responsive to Keller’s 
asserted interests here. Cf. Hart, 717 F.3d at 157 
(“Effectively, [EA] argues that [Hart] should be unable 
to assert a claim for appropriating his likeness as a 
football player precisely because his likeness was used 
for a game about football. Adopting this line of 
reasoning threatens to turn the right of publicity on its 
head.”). 
We recognize that Rogers also dealt with a 
right-of-publicity claim-one under Oregon law—and 
applied a modified version of its Lanham Act test in 
order to adapt to that particular context: 
In light of the Oregon Court’s concern for the 
protection of free expression, . . . the right of 
publicity [would not] bar the use of a celebrity’s 
name in a movie title unless the title was “wholly 
unrelated” to the movie or was “simply a 
disguised commercial advertisement for the sale 
of goods or services.” 
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875 F.2d at 1004. However, the Rogers court was faced 
with a situation in which the “Oregon Courts . . . [had] 
not determined the scope of the common law right of 
publicity in that state.” Id. at 1002. In the absence of 
clear state-law precedent, the Rogers court was 
“obliged to engage in the uncertain task of predicting 
what the New York courts would predict the Oregon 
courts would rule as to the contours of a right of 
publicity under Oregon law.” Id. In light of Comedy III 
and its progeny, we are faced with no such uncertain 
task. 
Lastly, we note that the only circuit court to import 
the Rogers test into the publicity arena, the Sixth 
Circuit, has done so inconsistently. In Parks v. LaFace 
Records, the Sixth Circuit indicated that the Rogers 
test was appropriate for right-of-publicity claims, 
noting that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition had endorsed use of the test in that 
context. 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 
cmt. c). Subsequently, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publishing, Inc., the court acknowledged the Parks 
decision but did not apply the Rogers test to the Ohio 
right-of-publicity claim in question. 332 F.3d at 915, 936 
& n.17 (6th Cir. 2003). Instead, the court applied a 
balancing test from comment d in the Restatement 
(analyzing “the substantiality and market effect of the 
use of the celebrity’s image . . . in light of the 
informational and creative content”), as well as the 
transformative use test from Comedy III. Id. at 937–38; 
see Hart, 717 F.3d at 157 (“We find Parks to be less 
than persuasive [as to the applicability of the Rogers 
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test to rightof-publicity cases] given that just over a 
month later another panel of the Sixth Circuit decided 
[ETW], a right of publicity case where the Circuit 
applied the Transformative Use Test.”). Similarly, the 
Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996), 
and the Eighth Circuit in C.B.C. Distribution and 
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), rejected the 
Rogers test in favor of a flexible case-by-case approach 
that takes into account the celebrity’s interest in 
retaining his or her publicity and the public’s interest in 
free expression. Therefore, we decline EA’s invitation 
to extend the Rogers test to right-of-publicity claims. 
C 
California has developed two additional defenses 
aimed at protecting the reporting of factual information 
under state law. One of these defenses only applies to 
common law rightof-publicity claims while the other 
only applies to statutory right-of-publicity claims. 
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 
Cal.App.4th 790, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 639, 640 (Ct. App. 
1995). Liability will not lie for common law 
right-of-publicity claims for the “publication of matters 
in the public interest.” Id. at 640–41. Similarly, liability 
will not lie for statutory right-of-publicity claims for the 
“use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or 
sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign.” 
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d). Although these defenses are 
based on First Amendment concerns, Gill v. Hearst 
Publ’g Co., 40 Cal.2d 224, 253 P.2d 441, 443–44 (Cal. 
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1953), they are not coextensive with the Federal 
Constitution, New Kids on the Block v. News Am. 
Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 310 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992), and 
their application is thus a matter of state law. 
EA argues that these defenses give it the right to 
“incorporate athletes’ names, statistics, and other 
biographical information” into its expressive works, as 
the defenses were “designed to create ‘extra breathing 
space’ for the use of a person’s name in connection with 
matters of public interest.” Keller responds that the 
right of publicity yields to free use of a public figure’s 
likeness only to the extent reasonably required to 
report information to the public or publish factual data, 
and that the defenses apply only to broadcasts or 
accounts of public affairs, not to EA’s NCAA Football 
games, which do not contain or constitute such 
reporting about Keller. 
California courts have generally analyzed the 
common law defense and the statutory defense 
separately, but it is clear that both defenses protect 
only the act of publishing or reporting. By its terms, 
§ 3344(d) is limited to a “broadcast or account,” and we 
have confirmed that the common law defense is about a 
publication or reporting of newsworthy items. Hilton, 
599 F.3d at 912. However, most of the discussion by 
California courts pertains to whether the subject 
matter of the communication is of “public interest” or 
related to “news” or “public affairs,” leaving little 
guidance as to when the communication constitutes a 
publication or reporting. 
For instance, in Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., a well 
known surfer sued the producer of a documentary on 
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surfing entitled “The Legends of Malibu,” claiming 
misappropriation of his name and likeness. 15 
Cal.App.4th 536, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790, 791 (Ct. App. 
1993). The court held that the documentary was 
protected because it was “a fair comment on real life 
events which have caught the popular imagination.” Id. 
at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
explained that surfing “has created a lifestyle that 
influences speech, behavior, dress, and entertainment,” 
has had “an economic impact,” and “has also had a 
significant influence on the popular culture,” such that 
“[i]t would be difficult to conclude that a surfing 
documentary does not fall within the category of public 
affairs.” Id. at 794–95. Similarly, in Gionfriddo v. Major 
League Baseball, retired professional baseball players 
alleged that Major League Baseball violated their right 
of publicity by displaying “factual data concerning the 
players, their performance statistics, and verbal 
descriptions and video depictions of their play” in game 
programs and on its website. 94 Cal.App.4th 400, 114 
Cal.Rptr.2d 307, 314 (Ct. App. 2001). The court 
reasoned that “[t]he recitation and discussion of factual 
data concerning the athletic performance of these 
plaintiffs command a substantial public interest, and, 
therefore, is a form of expression due substantial 
constitutional protection.”  Id. at 315. And in Montana 
v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., former NFL 
quarterback Joe Montana brought a right-ofpublicity 
action against a newspaper for selling posters 
containing previously published pages from the 
newspaper depicting the many Super Bowl victories by 
Montana and the San Francisco 49ers. Montana, 40 
Cal.Rptr.2d at 639–40. The court found that “[p]osters 
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portraying the 49’ers’ [sic] victories are . . . a form of 
public interest presentation to which protection must 
be extended.” Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
We think that, unlike in Gionfriddo, Montana, and 
Dora, EA is not publishing or reporting factual data. 
EA’s video game is a means by which users can play 
their own virtual football games, not a means for 
obtaining information about real-world football games. 
Although EA has incorporated certain actual player 
information into the game (height, weight, etc.), its case 
is considerably weakened by its decision not to include 
the athletes’ names along with their likenesses and 
statistical data. EA can hardly be considered to be 
“reporting” on Keller’s career at Arizona State and 
Nebraska when it is not even using Keller’s name in 
connection with his avatar in the game. Put simply, 
EA’s interactive game is not a publication of facts about 
college football; it is a game, not a reference source. 
These state law defenses, therefore, do not apply.12 
                                                            
12 We similarly reject Judge Thomas’s argument that Keller’s 
right-of publicity claim should give way to the First Amendment 
in light of the fact that “the essence of NCAA Football is founded 
on publicly available data.” Dissent at 40. Judge Thomas compares 
NCAA Football to the fantasy baseball products that the Eighth 
Circuit deemed protected by the First Amendment in the face of a 
right-of-publicity claim in C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, 505 
F.3d at 823–24. Dissent at 40. But there is a big difference between 
a video game like NCAA Football and fantasy baseball products 
like those at issue in C.B.C. Those products merely “incorporate[d] 
the names along with performance and biographical data of actual 
major league baseball players.” Id. at 820. NCAA Football, on the 
other hand, uses virtual likenesses of actual college football 
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III 
Under California’s transformative use defense, 
EA’s use of the likenesses of college athletes like 
Samuel Keller in its video games is not, as a matter of 
law, protected by the First Amendment. We reject 
EA’s suggestion to import the Rogers test into the 
right-of-publicity arena, and conclude that statelaw 
defenses for the reporting of information do not protect 
EA’s use. 
AFFIRMED. 
                                                                                                                          
players. It is seemingly true that each likeness is generated 
largely from publicly available data—though, as Judge Thomas 
acknowledges, EA solicits certain information directly from 
schools—but finding this fact dispositive would neuter the right of 
publicity in our digital world. Computer programmers with the 
appropriate expertise can create a realistic likeness of any 
celebrity using only publicly available data. If EA creates a virtual 
likeness of Tom Brady using only publicly available data—public 
images and videos of Brady—does EA have free reign to use that 
likeness in commercials without violating Brady’s right of 
publicity? We think not, and thus must reject Judge Thomas’s 
point about the public availability of much of the data used given 
that EA produced and used actual likenesses of the athletes 
involved. 
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THOMAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
Because the creative and transformative elements 
of Electronic Arts’ NCAA Football video game series 
predominate over the commercial use of the athletes’ 
likenesses, the First Amendment protects EA from 
liability. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
As expressive works, video games are entitled to 
First Amendment protection.  Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 
2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). The First Amendment 
affords additional protection to NCAA Football 
because it involves a subject of substantial public 
interest: collegiate football. Moore v. Univ. of Notre 
Dame, 968 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1997). 
Because football is a matter of public interest, the use 
of the images of athletes is entitled to constitutional 
protection, even if profits are involved. Montana v. San 
Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal.App.4th 790, 40 
Cal.Rptr.2d 639, 643 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); see also 
Cal. Civ. Code §3344(d) (exempting from liability the 
“use of a name . . . or likeness in connection with any . . . 
public affairs, or sports broadcast or account”). 
Where it is recognized, the tort of appropriation is a 
creature of common law or statute, depending on the 
jurisdiction. However, the right to compensation for 
the misappropriation for commercial use of one’s image 
or celebrity is far from absolute. In every jurisdiction, 
any right of publicity must be balanced against the 
constitutional protection afforded by the First 
Amendment. Courts have employed a variety of 
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methods in balancing the rights. See, e .g., Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
The California Supreme Court applies a 
“transformative use” test it formulated in Comedy III 
Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387, 
106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).1 
As the majority properly notes, the transformative 
use defense is “a balancing test between the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity based on 
whether the work in question adds significant creative 
elements so as to be transformed into something more 
than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”  Comedy 
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 799. The rationale 
for the test, as the majority notes, is that “when a work 
contains significant transformative elements, it is not 
only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, 
but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic 
interest protected by the right of publicity.” Id. at 808. 
The five considerations articulated in Comedy III, 
and cited by the majority, are whether: (1) the celebrity 
likeness is one of the raw materials from which an 
                                                            
1 I agree with the majority that the test articulated in Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), should not be employed in 
this context. The Rogers test is appropriately applied in Lanham 
Act cases, where the primary concern is with the danger of 
consumer confusion when a work is depicted as something it is not. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). However, the right of publicity is an 
economic right to use the value of one own’s celebrity. Zacchini v. 
Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 
53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977). Therefore, a more nuanced balancing is 
required. In our context, I believe the transformative use test—if 
correctly applied to the work as a whole—provides the proper 
analytical framework. 
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original work is synthesized; (2) the work is primarily 
the defendant’s own expression if the expression is 
something other than the likeness of the celebrity; (3) 
the literal and imitative or creative elements 
predominate in the work; (4) the marketability and 
economic value of the challenged work derives 
primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted; and 
(5) an artist’s skill and talent has been manifestly 
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a 
conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to 
commercially exploit the celebrity’s fame. Id. at 809–10. 
Although these considerations are often distilled as 
analytical factors, Justice Mosk was careful in Comedy 
III not to label them as such. Indeed, the focus of 
Comedy III is a more holistic examination of whether 
the transformative and creative elements of a 
particular work predominate over commercially based 
literal or imitative depictions. The distinction is critical, 
because excessive deconstruction of Comedy III can 
lead to misapplication of the test. And it is at this 
juncture that I must respectfully part ways with my 
colleagues in the majority. 
The majority confines its inquiry to how a single 
athlete’s likeness is represented in the video game, 
rather than examining the transformative and creative 
elements in the video game as a whole. In my view, this 
approach contradicts the holistic analysis required by 
the transformative use test. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, 
Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170–76 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J., 
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dissenting).2 The salient question is whether the entire 
work is transformative, and whether the 
transformative elements predominate, rather than 
whether an individual persona or image has been 
altered. 
When EA’s NCAA Football video game series is 
examined carefully, and put in proper context, I 
conclude that the creative and transformative elements 
of the games predominate over the commercial use of 
the likenesses of the athletes within the games. 
A 
The first step in conducting a balancing is to 
examine the creative work at issue. At its essence, 
EA’s NCAA Football is a work of interactive historical 
fiction. Although the game changes from year to year, 
its most popular features predominately involve 
role-playing by the gamer. For example, a player can 
create a virtual image of himself as a potential college 
football player. The virtual player decides which 
position he would like to play, then participates in a 
series of “tryouts” or competes in an entire high school 
season to gauge his skill. Based on his performance, the 
virtual player is ranked and available to play at select 
colleges. The player chooses among the colleges, then 
assumes the role of a college football player. He also 
selects a major, the amount of time he wishes to spend 
on social activities, and practice—all of which may 
affect the virtual player’s performance. He then plays 
                                                            
2 I agree fully with Judge Ambro’s excellent dissent in Hart, which 
describes the analytic flaws of applying a transformative use test 
outside the context of the work as a whole. 
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his position on the college team. In some versions of the 
game, in another mode, the virtual player can engage in 
a competition for the Heisman Trophy. In another 
popular mode, the gamer becomes a virtual coach. The 
coach scouts, recruits, and develops entirely fictional 
players for his team. The coach can then promote the 
team’s evolution over decades of seasons. 
The college teams that are supplied in the game do 
replicate the actual college teams for that season, 
including virtual athletes who bear the statistical and 
physical dimensions of the actual college athletes. But, 
unlike their professional football counterparts in the 
Madden NFL series, the NCAA football players in 
these games are not identified. 
The gamers can also change their abilities, 
appearances, and physical characteristics at will. 
Keller’s impressive physical likeness can be morphed 
by the gamer into an overweight and slow virtual 
athlete, with anemic passing ability. And the gamer can 
create new virtual players out of whole cloth. Players 
can change teams. The gamer could pit Sam Keller 
against himself, or a stronger or weaker version of 
himself, on a different team. Or the gamer could play 
the game endlessly without ever encountering Keller’s 
avatar. In the simulated games, the gamer controls not 
only the conduct of the game, but the weather, crowd 
noise, mascots, and other environmental factors. Of 
course, one may play the game leaving the players 
unaltered, pitting team against team. But, in this 
context as well, the work is one of historic fiction. The 
gamer controls the teams, players, and games. 
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Applying the Comedy III considerations to NCAA 
Football in proper holistic context, the considerations 
favor First Amendment protection. The athletic 
likenesses are but one of the raw materials from which 
the broader game is constructed. The work, considered 
as a whole, is primarily one of EA’s own expression. 
The creative and transformative elements predominate 
over the commercial use of likenesses. The 
marketability and economic value of the game comes 
from the creative elements within, not from the pure 
commercial exploitation of a celebrity image. The game 
is not a conventional portrait of a celebrity, but a work 
consisting of many creative and transformative 
elements. 
The video game at issue is much akin to the 
creations the California Supreme Court found 
protected in Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th 881, 134 
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003), where the 
two fabled guitarists Johnny and Edgar Winter were 
easily identifiable, but depicted as chimeras. It is also 
consistent with the California Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 
Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607, 609–10 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006), where a character easily identified as 
singer Kierin Kirby, more popularly known as Lady 
Miss Kier, was transformed into a “‘fanciful, creative 
character’ who exists in the context of a unique and 
expressive video game.” Id. at 618. So, too, are the 
virtual players who populate the world of the NCAA 
Football series. 
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 192 
Cal.App.4th 1018, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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2011), is not to the contrary. The literal representations 
in No Doubt were not, and could not be, transformed in 
any way. Indeed, in No Doubt, the bandmembers posed 
for motion-capture photography to allow reproduction 
of their likenesses, id. at 402, and the Court of Appeal 
underscored the fact that the video game did not 
“permit players to alter the No Doubt avatars in any 
respect” and the avatars remained “at all times 
immutable images of the real celebrity musicians,” id. 
at 410. The Court of Appeal cited character 
immutability as a chief factor distinguishing that case 
from Winter and Kirby. Id. Unlike the avatars in No 
Doubt, the virtual players in NCAA Football are 
completely mutable and changeable at the whim of the 
gamer. The majority places great reliance on No Doubt 
as support for its proposition that the initial placement 
of realistic avatars in the game overcomes the First 
Amendment’s protection, but the Court of Appeal in No 
Doubt rejected such a cramped construction, noting 
that “even literal reproductions of celebrities may be 
‘transformed’ into expressive works based on the 
context into which the celebrity image is placed.” Id. at 
410 (citing Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 
797).3 
Unlike the majority, I would not punish EA for the 
realism of its games and for the skill of the artists who 
created realistic settings for the football games. 
Majority op. at 21 n.10. That the lifelike roar of the 
                                                            
3 Of course, to the extent that the Court of Appeal’s opinion in No 
Doubt may be read to be in tension with the transformative use 
test as articulated by the California Supreme Court in Comedy III 
and Winter, it must yield. 
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crowd and the crunch of pads contribute to the gamer’s 
experience demonstrates how little of NCAA Football 
is driven by the particular likeness of Sam Keller, or 
any of the other plaintiffs, rather than by the game’s 
artistic elements. 
In short, considering the creative elements alone in 
this case satisfies the transformative use test in favor 
of First Amendment protection. 
B 
Although one could leave the analysis with an 
examination of the transformative and creative aspects 
of the game, a true balancing requires an inquiry as to 
the other side of the scales: the publicity right at stake. 
Here, as well, the NCAA Football video game series 
can be distinguished from the traditional right of 
publicity cases, both from a quantitative and a 
qualitative perspective. 
As a quantitative matter, NCAA Football is 
different from other right of publicity cases in the sheer 
number of virtual actors involved. Most right of 
publicity cases involve either one celebrity, or a finite 
and defined group of celebrities. Comedy III involved 
literal likenesses of the Three Stooges.  Hilton v. 
Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 909–12 (9th Cir. 2009), 
involved the literal likeness of Paris Hilton. Winter 
involved the images of the rock star brother duo. Kirby 
involved the likeness of one singer. No Doubt focused 
on the likenesses of the members of a specific legendary 
band. 
In contrast, NCAA Football includes not just Sam 
Keller, but thousands of virtual actors. This 
39a 
consideration is of particular significance when we 
examine, as instructed by Comedy III, whether the 
source of the product marketability comes from 
creative elements or from pure exploitation of a 
celebrity image. 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810. 
There is not, at this stage of the litigation, any evidence 
as to the personal marketing power of Sam Keller, as 
distinguished from the appeal of the creative aspects of 
the product. Regardless, the sheer number of athletes 
involved inevitably diminish the significance of the 
publicity right at issue. Comedy III involved literal 
depictions of the Three Stooges on lithographs and 
T-shirts. Winter involved characters depicted in a 
comic strip. Kirby and No Doubt involved pivotal 
characters in a video game. The commercial image of 
the celebrities in each case was central to the 
production, and its contact with the consumer was 
immediate and unavoidable. In contrast, one could play 
NCAA Football thousands of times without ever 
encountering a particular avatar. In context of the 
collective, an individual’s publicity right is relatively 
insignificant. Put another way, if an anonymous virtual 
player is tackled in an imaginary video game and no one 
notices, is there any right of publicity infringed at all? 
The sheer quantity of the virtual players in the 
game underscores the inappropriateness of analyzing 
the right of publicity through the lens of one likeness 
only. Only when the creative work is considered in 
complete context can a proper analysis be conducted. 
As a qualitative matter, the essence of NCAA 
Football is founded on publicly available data, which is 
not protected by any individual publicity rights. It is 
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true that EA solicits and receives information directly 
from colleges and universities. But the information is 
hardly proprietary. Personal vital statistics for players 
are found in college programs and media guides. 
Likewise, playing statistics are easily available. In this 
respect, the information used by EA is 
indistinguishable from the information used in fantasy 
athletic leagues, for which the First Amendment 
provides protection, C.B. C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. 
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007), or much beloved 
statistical board games, such as Strat–OMatic. An 
athlete’s right of publicity simply does not encompass 
publicly available statistical data. See, e.g., IMS Health 
Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 271–72 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The 
First Amendment protects ‘[e]ven dry information, 
devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic 
expression.’” (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001)) (alteration in 
original)).4 
Further, the structure of the game is not founded on 
exploitation of an individual’s publicity rights. The 
players are unidentified and anonymous. It is true that 
third-party software is available to quickly identify the 
players, but that is not part of the EA package. And the 
                                                            
4 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, I do not claim that any use 
of a likeness founded on publicly available information is 
transformative. Majority op. 30–31 n.12. The majority’s analogy to 
a commercial featuring Tom Brady is inapposite for at least two 
reasons: (1) a commercial is not interactive in the same way that 
NCAA Football is, and (2) Brady’s marketing power is well 
established, while that of the plaintiffs is not. 
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fact that the players can be identified by the 
knowledgeable user by their position, team, and 
statistics is somewhat beside the point. The issue is 
whether the marketability of the product is driven by 
an individual celebrity, or by the game itself. Comedy 
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810. Player 
anonymity, while certainly not a complete defense, 
bears on the question of how we balance the right of 
publicity against the First Amendment. This feature of 
the game places it in stark contrast with No Doubt, 
where the whole point of the enterprise was the 
successful commercial exploitation of the specifically 
identified, worldfamous musicians. 
Finally, as a qualitative matter, the publicity rights 
of college athletes are remarkably restricted. This 
consideration is critical because the “right to exploit 
commercially one’s celebrity is primarily an economic 
right.”  Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 
Cal.App.4th 400, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 307, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001). NCAA rules prohibit athletes from benefitting 
economically from any success on the field. NCAA 
Bylaw 12.5 specifically prohibits commercial licensing 
of an NCAA athlete’s name or picture. NCAA, 2012–13 
NCAA Division I Manual § 12.5.2.1 (2012). Before 
being allowed to compete each year, all Division I 
NCAA athletes must sign a contract stating that they 
understand the prohibition on licensing and affirming 
that they have not violated any amateurism rules. In 
short, even if an athlete wished to license his image to 
EA, the athlete could not do so without destroying 
amateur status. Thus, an individual college athlete’s 
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right of publicity is extraordinarily circumscribed and, 
in practical reality, nonexistent.5 
In sum, even apart from consideration of 
transformative elements, examination of the right of 
publicity in question also resolves the balance in favor 
of the First Amendment. The quantity of players 
involved dilutes the commercial impact of any 
particular player and the scope of the publicity right is 
significantly reduced by the fact that: (1) a player 
cannot own the individual, publicly available statistics 
on which the game is based; (2) the players are not 
identified in the game; and (3) NCAA college athletes 
                                                            
5 The issue of whether this structure is fair to the student athlete 
is beyond the scope of this appeal, but forms a significant backdrop 
to the discussion. The NCAA received revenues of $871.6 million 
in fiscal year 2011–12, with 81% of the money coming from 
television and marketing fees. However, few college athletes will 
ever receive any professional compensation. The NCAA reports 
that in 2011, there were 67,887 college football players. Of those, 
15,086 were senior players, and only 255 athletes were drafted for 
a professional team. Thus, only 1.7% of seniors received any 
subsequent professional economic compensation for their athletic 
endeavors. NCAA, Estimated Probability of Competing in 
Athletics Beyond the High School Interscholastic Level (2011), 
available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ 
ncaa/pdfs/ 2011/2011 +probability+of+going+pro. 
And participation in college football can come at a terrible 
cost. The NCAA reports that, during a recent five-year 
period, college football players suffered 41,000 injuries, 
including 23 non-fatal catastrophic injuries and 11 fatalties 
from indirect catastrophic injuries. NCAA, Football 
Injuries: Data From the 2004/05 to 2008/09 Seasons, 
available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
public/ncaa/health+and+safety/sports+injuries/resources/f
ootball+injuries. 
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do not have the right to license their names and 
likenesses, even if they chose to do so.6 
II 
Given the proper application of the transformative 
use test, Keller is unlikely to prevail. The balance of 
interests falls squarely on the side of the First 
Amendment. The stakes are not small. The logical 
consequence of the majority view is that all realistic 
depictions of actual persons, no matter how incidental, 
are protected by a state law right of publicity 
regardless of the creative context. This logic 
jeopardizes the creative use of historic figures in 
motion pictures, books, and sound recordings. Absent 
the use of actual footage, the motion picture Forrest 
Gump might as well be just a box of chocolates. 
Without its historical characters, Midnight in Paris 
would be reduced to a pedestrian domestic squabble. 
The majority’s holding that creative use of realistic 
images and personas does not satisfy the 
transformative use test cannot be reconciled with the 
many cases affording such works First Amendment 
                                                            
6 While acknowledging that these considerations are relevant to 
the Comedy III analysis, the majority says EA’s use of realistic 
likenesses demonstrates that it sees “value in having an avatar 
designed to mimic each individual player.” Majority op. at 17 n.7. 
But the same is true of any right of publicity case. The defendants 
in Winter saw value in using comic book characters that resembled 
the Winter brothers. Andy Warhol—whose portraits were 
discussed in Comedy III—saw value in using images of celebrities 
such as Marilyn Monroe. In those cases, the products’ 
marketability derives primarily from the creative elements, not 
from a pure commercial exploitation of a celebrity image. The 
same is true of NCAA Football. 
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protection.7 I respectfully disagree with this potentially 
dangerous and out-of-context interpretation of the 
transformative use test. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                            
7 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 
2003) (affording First Amendment protection to an artist’s use of 
photographs of Tiger Woods); J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of 
Publicity and Privacy § 8.65 (2013 ed.) (collecting cases); Hart, 717 
F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (describing cases). Football. 
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United States District Court 
N.D. California 
 
Samuel Michael KELLER, on behalf of himself and all 
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, 
v. 
ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC.; National Collegiate Ath-
letics Association; and Collegiate Licensing Company, 
Defendants. 
No. C 09–1967 CW. 
Feb. 8, 2010. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS  
TO DISMISS (Docket Nos. 34, 47, 48)  
AND ELECTRONIC ARTS’ ANTI–SLAPP  
MOTION TO STRIKE 
(Docket No. 35) 
CLAUDIA WILKEN, District Judge. 
Defendants Electronic Arts, Inc. (EA), the National 
Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) and the 
Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) move separately 
to dismiss Plaintiff Samuel Michael Keller’s claims 
against them. EA also moves to strike Plaintiff’s claims 
against it pursuant to California Civil Code section 
425.16 (Docket No. 35). Plaintiff opposes the motions. 
As amici curiae, James “Jim” Brown and Herbert 
Anthony Adderley filed a brief in opposition to EA’s 
motion to dismiss. The motions were heard on 
December 17, 2009. Having considered all of the papers 
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submitted by the parties, the Court DENIES EA’s 
Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 34), GRANTS NCAA’s 
Motion in part and DENIES it in part (Docket No. 48), 
DENIES CLC’s Motion (Docket No. 47) and DENIES 
EA’s Motion to Strike (Docket No. 35). 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff is a former starting quarterback for the 
Arizona State University and University of Nebraska 
football teams. 
EA, a Delaware corporation with a principal place of 
business in California, develops interactive 
entertainment software. It produces, among other 
things, the “NCAA Football” series of video games. In 
the games, consumers can simulate football matches 
between college and university teams. Plaintiff alleges 
that, to make the games realistic, EA designs the 
virtual football players to resemble real-life college 
football athletes, including himself. He claims that 
these virtual players are nearly identical to their 
real-life counterparts: they share the same jersey 
numbers, have similar physical characteristics and 
come from the same home state. To enhance the 
accuracy of the player depictions, Plaintiff alleges, EA 
sends questionnaires to team equipment managers of 
college football teams. Although EA omits the real-life 
athletes’ names from “NCAA Football,” Plaintiff 
asserts that consumers may access online services to 
download team rosters and the athletes’ names, and 
upload them into the games. Plaintiff claims that, in 
recent iterations, EA has included features that 
facilitate the upload of this information. 
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Plaintiff alleges that EA uses his likeness without 
his consent. He asserts that NCAA, an unincorporated 
association based in Indiana, and CLC, a Georgia 
corporation headquartered in Atlanta, facilitated this 
use. Plaintiff claims that EA, NCAA and CLC met at 
NCAA’s Indiana headquarters and EA’s California 
headquarters to negotiate the agreements that underlie 
the alleged misconduct. 
Plaintiff alleges other misconduct by NCAA and 
CLC, related to NCAA’s amateurism rules. Plaintiff 
maintains that NCAA’s approval of EA’s games 
violates NCAA’s “duty to NCAA athletes to honor its 
own rules prohibiting the use of student likenesses....” 
Compl. ¶ 15. He cites NCAA Bylaw 12.5, which 
prohibits the commercial licensing of the “name, picture 
or likeness” of athletes at NCAA-member institutions. 
Compl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff asserts that CLC must honor 
NCAA’s prohibitions on the use of student likenesses. 
Plaintiff charges NCAA with violations of Indiana’s 
right of publicity statute, civil conspiracy and breach of 
contract. He charges CLC with civil conspiracy and 
unjust enrichment. Against EA, he pleads claims for 
violations of California’s statutory and common law 
rights of publicity, civil conspiracy, violation of 
California’s Unfair Competition Law and unjust 
enrichment. He intends to move to certify his case as a 
class action and seeks, among other things, damages 
and an injunction prohibiting the future use of his and 
putative class members’ likenesses. 
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LEGAL STANDARD 
A complaint must contain a “short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is appropriate 
only when the complaint does not give the defendant 
fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds 
on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In 
considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state 
a claim, the court will take all material allegations as 
true and construe them in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 
898 (9th Cir. 1986). However, this principle is 
inapplicable to legal conclusions; “threadbare recitals of 
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements,” are not taken as true. Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50, 173 L. 
Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
DISCUSSION 
I. Indiana Right of Publicity Claim 
Plaintiff alleges that NCAA violated his Indiana 
right of publicity. He argues that Indiana law applies to 
NCAA because its headquarters are located in Indiana 
and the alleged violation occurred in Indiana. NCAA 
argues that Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law 
because he does not allege that it used his image or 
likeness. Plaintiff responds that NCAA used his 
likeness because it “expressly reviewed and knowingly 
approved each version of each NCAA-brand videogame 
. . . .” Opp’n to NCAA’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4. 
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Under Indiana law, personalities have a property 
interest in, among other things, their images and 
likenesses. Ind. Code § 32–36–1–7. A personality is a 
living or deceased person whose image and likeness 
have commercial value. Id. § 32–36–1–6. Indiana Code 
section 32–36–1–8 provides, 
A person may not use an aspect of a 
personality’s right of publicity for a commercial 
purpose during the personality’s lifetime or for 
one hundred (100) years after the date of the 
personality’s death without having obtained 
previous written consent from a person . . . . 
(emphasis added). 
Although the parties do not offer controlling 
authority on this point, the plain language of the 
statute favors NCAA’s position. Plaintiff argues that 
NCAA’s liability under Indiana law arises from its 
knowing approval of EA’ s use of his likeness. This 
interpretation expands liability under the Indiana 
statute to include persons who enable right of publicity 
violations. However, Plaintiff does not offer any 
authority to show that section 32–36–1–8 encompasses 
this type of misconduct. The Court declines to adopt 
Plaintiff’s interpretation. 
Plaintiff makes a related argument that NCAA 
should be held liable under Indiana’s right of publicity 
statute as a co-conspirator of EA, which used his 
likeness. He cites cases that provide that 
co-conspirators can be held liable as joint tortfeasors 
for damages caused by another co-conspirator. See, e.g., 
Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 
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Cal.4th 503, 511, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454 
(1994); Boyle v. Anderson Fire Fighters Ass’n Local 
1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
However, these cases are inapposite because Plaintiff 
has not alleged that either EA or CLC, NCAA’s 
alleged co-conspirators, violated Indiana’s right of 
publicity statute. 
Plaintiff’s Indiana right of publicity claim against 
NCAA is dismissed with leave to amend to allege that 
NCAA used his likeness or conspired with others to 
violate his right of publicity under Indiana law. 
II. California Right of Publicity Claims 
California’s right of publicity statute provides, 
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, 
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any 
manner, on or in products, merchandise, or 
goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, 
or soliciting purchases of, products, 
merchandise, goods or services, without such 
person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any 
damages sustained by the person or persons 
injured as a result thereof. 
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a). The statutory right of 
publicity complements the common law right of 
publicity, which arises from the misappropriation tort 
derived from the law of privacy. See Comedy III 
Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 25 Cal.4th 387, 391, 106 
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (2001). To state a claim 
under California common law, a plaintiff must allege 
“‘(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) 
the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to 
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defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) 
lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.’” Hilton v. 
Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 889 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 
994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001)). Although the statutory and 
common law rights are similar, there are differences. 
For example, to state a claim under section 3344, a 
plaintiff must prove knowing use in addition to 
satisfying the elements of a common law claim. Kirby v. 
Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 55, 50 
Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (2006). 
EA does not contest the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s 
claims. It asserts, however, that his right of publicity 
claims are barred by the First Amendment and 
California law. The Court considers and rejects each of 
these defenses in turn. 
A. Transformative Use Defense1 
A defendant may raise an affirmative defense that 
the challenged work is “protected by the First 
Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant 
transformative elements or that the value of the work 
does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame.” 
Hilton, 580 F.3d at 889 (quoting Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th 
at 407, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The defense “poses what is 
essentially a balancing test between the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity.” Hilton, 580 
                                                 
1
 Amici invite the Court to adopt another standard to assess right 
of publicity claims. Because the Court finds that the transforma-
tive test is sufficient for the purposes of this motion, it does not 
address amici’s arguments. 
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F.3d at 889 (quoting Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th 
881, 885, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473 (2003)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
To determine whether a work is transformative, a 
court must inquire into 
whether the celebrity likeness is one of the “raw 
materials” from which an original work is 
synthesized, or whether the depiction or 
imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and 
substance of the work in question. We ask, in 
other words, whether a product containing a 
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has 
become primarily the defendant’s own 
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. 
And when we use the word “expression,” we 
mean expression of something other than the 
likeness of the celebrity. 
Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at 406, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 
P.3d 797. “An artist depicting a celebrity must 
contribute something more than a merely trivial 
variation, but create something recognizably his own, in 
order to qualify for legal protection.” Winter, 30 Cal.4th 
at 888, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473 (quoting 
Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at 408, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 
P.3d 797) (internal quotation and editing marks 
omitted). The analysis “simply requires the court to 
examine and compare the allegedly expressive work 
with the images of the plaintiff to discern if the 
defendant’s work contributes significantly distinctive 
and expressive content.” Kirby, 144 Cal.App.4th at 61, 
50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607. “If distinctions exist, the First 
Amendment bars claims based on appropriation of the 
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plaintiff’s identity or likeness; if not, the claims are not 
barred.” Id. 
Two California Supreme Court cases “bookend the 
spectrum” used to measure a work’s transformative 
nature. Hilton, 580 F.3d at 890–91. On one end, Comedy 
III provides an example of a nontransformative work. 
There, the defendant’s “literal, conventional depictions 
of The Three Stooges,” drawn in charcoal and printed 
on tee-shirts, did not contain transformative elements 
that warranted protection by the First Amendment. 
Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at 409, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 
P.3d 797. Interpreting Comedy III, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that “it is clear that merely merchandising a 
celebrity’s image without that person’s consent . . . does 
not amount to a transformative use.”  Hilton, 580 F.3d 
at 890. 
Winter offers the opposite bookend. There, a comic 
book publisher depicted two musicians, Johnny and 
Edgar Winter, as half-human, half-worm cartoon 
characters. Winter, 30 Cal.4th at 890, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 
634, 69 P.3d 473. The court affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that the 
images were sufficiently transformative. The court 
stated, 
Although the fictional characters Johnny and 
Edgar Autumn are less-than-subtle evocations 
of Johnny and Edgar Winter, the books do not 
depict plaintiffs literally. Instead, plaintiffs are 
merely part of the raw materials from which the 
comic books were synthesized. 
Id. 
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Using Comedy III and Winter as guideposts, Kirby 
applied the transformative use analysis to a video 
game. There, the court held that the main character in 
the defendant’s video game was transformed. The 
plaintiff was a musician and dancer, known for saying 
the phrase “ooh la la.” Kirby, 144 Cal.App.4th at 50–51, 
50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607. Ulala, the main character in the 
defendant’s game, worked as a news reporter in the 
twenty-fifth century, “dispatched to investigate an 
invasion of Earth.” Id. at 52, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607. 
Although there were similarities between the two, the 
court held Ulala to be “more than a mere likeness or 
literal depiction of Kirby.” Id. at 59, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607. 
“Ulala contains sufficient expressive content to 
constitute a ‘transformative work’ under the test 
articulated by the [California] Supreme Court.” Id. In 
particular, Ulala was extremely tall and wore clothing 
that differed from the plaintiff’s and the setting for the 
game was unlike any in which she had appeared. Id. 
Here, EA’s depiction of Plaintiff in “NCAA 
Football” is not sufficiently transformative to bar his 
California right of publicity claims as a matter of law.2 
                                                 
2
 EA asks the Court to take judicial notice of the content of the 
video games “NCAA Football 2006” through “NCAA Football 
2009,” “NCAA March Madness 2006” through “NCAA March 
Madness 2008,” and “NCAA Basketball 2009;” paragraphs four of 
the Strauser and O’Brien Declarations summarizing the content of 
these video games; various press releases announcing the release 
date of the video games; a United States Copyright Office docu-
ment indicating the date of first publication for “NCAA March 
Madness 2007;” an August 15, 2008 order from Kent v. Universal 
Studios, Inc., Case No. 08–2704 (C.D. Cal.); and the content of the 
CBSSports.com Fantasy College Football game. (Docket No. 36.) 
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In the game, the quarterback for Arizona State 
University shares many of Plaintiff’s characteristics. 
For example, the virtual player wears the same jersey 
number, is the same height and weight and hails from 
the same state. EA’s depiction of Plaintiff is far from 
the transmogrification of the Winter brothers. EA does 
not depict Plaintiff in a different form; he is 
represented as he what he was: the starting 
quarterback for Arizona State University. Further, 
unlike in Kirby, the game’s setting is identical to where 
the public found Plaintiff during his collegiate career: 
on the football field. 
EA asserts that the video game, taken as a whole, 
contains transformative elements. However, the broad 
view EA asks the Court to take is not supported by 
precedent. In Winter, the court focused on the 
depictions of the plaintiffs, not the content of the other 
portions of the comic book. The court in Kirby did the 
same: it compared Ulala with the plaintiff; its analysis 
                                                                                                    
Generally, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court cannot consider 
material outside of the complaint.  Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 
453 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds in Galbraith v. 
County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). How-
ever, a court may consider exhibits submitted with the complaint 
and those documents “whose contents are alleged in a complaint 
and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not 
physically attached to the pleading.” Id. at 453–54. 
Because Plaintiff refers to the video games in his 
complaint, the Court GRANTS EA’s request for judicial 
notice of them. Plaintiff does not mention the press 
releases or other materials proffered by EA. Therefore, 
the Court DENIES EA’s request as to the other 
materials. 
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did not extend beyond the game’s elements unrelated 
to Ulala. These cases show that this Court’s focus must 
be on the depiction of Plaintiff in “NCAA Football,” not 
the game’s other elements. 
Accordingly, at this stage, EA’s transformative use 
defense fails. 
B. Public Interest Defense 
“Under California law, ‘no cause of action will lie for 
the publication of matters in the public interest, which 
rests on the right of the public to know and the freedom 
of the press to tell it.’” Hilton, 580 F.3d at 892 (quoting 
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 
Cal.App.4th 790, 793, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 639 (1995)). 
“‘Public interest attaches to people who by their 
accomplishments or mode of living create a bona fide 
attention to their activities.’” Hilton, 580 F.3d at 892 
(quoting Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal.App.4th 
536, 542, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 (1993)). 
In Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, the court 
held that the defendants were entitled to the public 
interest defense. 94 Cal.App.4th 400, 415, 114 
Cal.Rptr.2d 307 (2001). There, the plaintiffs, four 
former baseball players, claimed that the defendants’ 
use of their names and statistics violated their rights of 
publicity. Id. at 405–07, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 307. Their 
information appeared on a website, which reported 
historical team rosters and listed names of players who 
won awards during each season. Id. at 406, 114 
Cal.Rptr.2d 307. The defendants also included still 
photographs of the plaintiffs from their playing days in 
video documentaries. Id. The court characterized these 
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uses as “simply making historical facts available to the 
public through game programs, Web sites and video 
clips.” Id. at 411, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 307. Because the 
public had an interest in the plaintiffs’ athletic 
performance, the First Amendment protected the 
“recitation and discussion of [their] factual data.” Id. 
The public interest defense also applied in Montana. 
There, the defendant newspaper sold posters 
containing reproductions of newspaper pages reporting 
on the San Francisco 49ers’ win in the 1990 Super Bowl; 
these pages contained images of the plaintiff. 34 
Cal.App.4th at 792, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 639. The plaintiff 
conceded that the original newspaper accounts were 
protected by the First Amendment, but challenged 
their reproduction as posters. Id. at 794, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 
639. The court held that the posters were entitled to 
the same First Amendment protection as the original 
news stories. The court stated, 
Montana’s name and likeness appeared in the 
posters for precisely the same reason they 
appeared on the original newspaper front pages: 
because Montana was a major player in 
contemporaneous newsworthy sports events. 
Under these circumstances, Montana’s claim 
that SJMN used his face and name solely to 
extract the commercial value from them fails. 
Id. (emphasis in original). Citing Montana, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that the public interest defense “is about 
. . . publication or reporting.”  Hilton, 580 F.3d at 892. 
“NCAA Football” is unlike the works in Gionfriddo 
and Montana. The game does not merely report or 
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publish Plaintiff’s statistics and abilities. On the 
contrary, EA enables the consumer to assume the 
identity of various student athletes and compete in 
simulated college football matches. EA is correct that 
products created for entertainment deserve 
constitutional protection. See, e.g., Gionfriddo, 94 
Cal.App.4th at 410, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 307 
(“Entertainment features receive the same 
constitutional protection as factual news reports.”). But 
it does not follow that these protections are absolute 
and always trump the right of publicity. 
EA cites cases in which courts held that the public 
interest exception protected online fantasy baseball 
and football games. Although these games are more 
analogous to “NCAA Football,” the cases are 
nonetheless distinguishable. In C.B.C. Distribution and 
Marketing v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
a declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff sold 
“fantasy baseball products” that included the names 
and statistics of major league baseball players. 505 F.3d 
818, 820–21 (8th Cir. 2007). Through these products, 
consumers could form fantasy baseball teams and 
compete with other users. Id. at 820. “A participant’s 
success ... depend[ed] on the actual performance of the 
fantasy team’s players on their respective actual teams 
during the course of the major league baseball season.” 
Id. at 820–21. The defendant counterclaimed, arguing 
that these products violated players’ rights of publicity. 
The court disagreed. It analogized the case to 
Gionfriddo, and held that the use of the players’ 
information in the fantasy game was a “‘recitation and 
discussion’” of the players’ information. Id. at 823–24 
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(quoting Gionfriddo, 94 Cal.App.4th at 411, 114 
Cal.Rptr.2d 307). 
C.B.C. Distribution is inapplicable here. Success in 
“NCAA Football” does not depend on updated reports 
of the real-life players’ progress during the college 
football season. Further, EA’s game provides more 
than just the players’ names and statistics; it offers a 
depiction of the student athletes’ physical 
characteristics and, as noted, enables consumers to 
control the virtual players on a simulated football field. 
EA’ s use of Plaintiff’s likeness goes far beyond what 
the court considered in C.B.C. Distribution. 
EA is not entitled to the public interest defense on 
this motion. 
C. Section 3344(d) Exemption 
California Civil Code section 3344(d) provides a 
public affairs exemption to the statutory right of 
publicity. It exempts from liability under section 3344 
“a use of a name ... or likeness in connection with any 
news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or 
any political campaign.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d). This 
exemption is not coextensive with the public interest 
defense; it “is designed to avoid First Amendment 
questions in the area of misappropriation by providing 
extra breathing space for the use of a person’s name in 
connection with matters of public interest.” New Kids 
on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 310 
n.10 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 
149 Cal.App.3d 409, 421, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1983)). 
In Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., a California court 
held that section 3344(d) barred a plaintiff’s statutory 
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right of publicity claim. 15 Cal.App.4th at 546, 18 
Cal.Rptr.2d 790. The defendant’s documentary on 
surfing contained, among other things, the plaintiff’s 
name and likeness. Id. at 540, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790. The 
court held that this use was exempted by section 
3344(d) because the plaintiff’s name and likeness were 
used in connection with public affairs. In doing so, the 
court addressed the meaning of “public affairs.” The 
court distinguished “public affairs” from “news,” 
stating that “‘public affairs’ was intended to mean 
something less important than news.” Dora, 15 
Cal.App.4th at 545, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790. Thus, the 
subject matter encompassed by public affairs is not 
limited “to topics that might be covered on public 
television or public radio.” Id. at 546, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 
790. 
Here, Plaintiff does not dispute EA’s contention 
that college athletics are “public affairs.” He asserts, 
however, that section 3344(d) only applies to factual 
reporting.3 In essence, he asserts that section 3344(d) 
applies to the same type of “reporting” as does the 
public interest defense. 
Neither party offered direct authority on the type 
of use for which the section 3344(d) exemption applies. 
                                                 
3
 EA understands Plaintiff to argue that reporting implicates 
newsworthy information. So interpreted, EA claims, Plaintiff’s 
argument must fail because Dora draws a distinction between 
“news” and “public affairs.” The Court does not construe Plaintiff’s 
argument in the same way. Instead, the Court reads Plaintiff to 
argue that “NCAA Football” does not constitute “reporting” and, 
as a result, EA does not use his name and likeness in a manner 
that is exempted by section 3344(d). 
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However, Montana is instructive. There, the court 
stated that “the statutory cause of action specifically 
exempts from liability the use of a name or likeness in 
connection with the reporting of a matter in the public 
interest.” 34 Cal.App.4th at 793, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 639 
(emphasis added). Thus, without authority requiring 
otherwise, the Court construes section 3344(d) to 
require the same type of activity as the public interest 
defense discussed above, namely reporting.4 Although 
“NCAA Football” is based on subject matter 
considered “public affairs,” EA is not entitled to the 
statutory defense because its use of Plaintiff’s image 
and likeness extends beyond reporting information 
about him. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s California statutory and 
common law right of publicity claims are not barred as 
a matter of law. III. Civil Conspiracy Claims 
Defendants move separately to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
civil conspiracy claims. All challenge the sufficiency of 
Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that he does not plead an 
underlying tort, which is a necessary element. CLC 
separately asserts the agent immunity defense. 
Plaintiff did not specify the state law under which 
his civil conspiracy claims arise. For the purposes of 
this motion, the Court assumes that his claims arise 
under California law. 
                                                 
4
 Although section 3344(d) and the public interest defense impli-
cate the same type of activity, they are nonetheless not coexten-
sive because section 3344(d) defines safe harbors for reporting in 
particular contexts. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 310 
n.10. 
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D. Sufficiency of the Claims 
Civil conspiracy “is not a cause of action, but a legal 
doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although 
not actually committing a tort themselves, share with 
the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in 
its perpetration.” Applied Equipment Corp., 7 Cal.4th 
at 510, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454 (citing Wyatt v. 
Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal.3d 773, 784, 157 Cal.Rptr. 
392, 598 P.2d 45 (1979)). “Standing alone, a conspiracy 
does no harm and engenders no tort liability. It must be 
activated by the commission of an actual tort.” Applied 
Equipment Corp., 7 Cal.4th at 511, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 
869 P.2d 454. 
A claim for civil conspiracy consists of three 
elements: “(1) the formation and operation of the 
conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful 
conduct.” Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp., 40 
Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 (1995). “The 
conspiring defendants must ... have actual knowledge 
that a tort is planned and concur in the tortious scheme 
with knowledge of its unlawful purpose.” Id. at 1582, 47 
Cal.Rptr.2d 752 (citing Wyatt, 24 Cal.3d at 784–86, 157 
Cal.Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45). This knowledge must be 
combined with an intent to aid in achieving the 
objective of the conspiracy. Kidron, 40 Cal.App.4th at 
1582, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752; Schick v. Bach, 193 
Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328, 238 Cal.Rptr. 902 (1987). A claim 
of unlawful conspiracy must contain “enough fact to 
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence of illegal agreement.” Twombly, 550 
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U.S. at 556. A bare allegation that a conspiracy existed 
does not suffice. Id. 
Plaintiff alleges that there were meetings among 
Defendants in California and Indiana. Compl. ¶¶ 54–56. 
He asserts that Defendants knew of NCAA principles 
barring the licensing of student-athlete identities, but 
nonetheless approved EA’s games containing the 
athletes’ likenesses without their consent. Compl. ¶¶ 
12–15. Finally, he claims that EA’s actions violated his 
California statutory and common law rights of 
publicity.5 These factual allegations sufficiently support 
liability under Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim.6 
                                                 
5
 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive “class 
members of their right to protect their names, likenesses and 
rights to publicity and their contractual, property rights.” Compl. 
¶ 80. For the purposes of this motion, the Court construes this al-
legation to refer to EA’s alleged violation of Plaintiff’s California 
right of publicity because he does not state a claim based on the 
tortious conduct of any other Defendant. 
6
 Citing Everest Investors 8 v. Whitehall Real Estate Limited 
Partnership XI, 100 Cal.App.4th 1102, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 (2002), 
CLC also argues that it cannot accrue tort liability under a civil 
conspiracy theory because Plaintiff has not alleged that it can 
make video games. This argument is unavailing. Everest Investors 
8 states that “tort liability from a conspiracy presupposes that the 
conspirator is legally capable of committing the tort—that he owes 
a duty to the plaintiff recognized by law and is potentially subject 
to liability for the breach of that duty.”   Id. at 1106, 123 
Cal.Rptr.2d 297. Nothing in the record indicates that CLC is le-
gally incapable of violating Plaintiff’s rights of publicity. 
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E. CLC’s Agent Immunity Defense 
CLC maintains that the agent immunity defense 
bars Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against it. This defense 
provides that no liability shall lie “if the alleged 
conspirator, though a participant in the agreement 
underlying the injury, was not personally bound by the 
duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as 
the agent or employee of the party who did have that 
duty.”   Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.3d 39, 44, 
260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 775 P.2d 508 (1989). 
CLC maintains that Plaintiff’s allegations that its 
role as a licensing company entering into agreements 
on behalf of NCAA establishes, as a matter of law, that 
it is NCAA’s agent. These allegations are not sufficient 
at this early stage to establish CLC’s entitlement to 
this defense. 
III. Section 17200 Claim 
EA maintains that Plaintiff fails to state a claim 
under California Business and Professions Code section 
17200 because he does not allege an underlying wrong 
or seek available relief. However, as discussed above, 
Plaintiff sufficiently asserts right of publicity and civil 
conspiracy claims. With regard to relief, he seeks an 
injunction, which EA concedes is available under 
section 17200. Thus, Plaintiff has stated a section 17200 
claim against EA. 
IV. Breach of Contract Claim 
NCAA argues that Plaintiff does not state a breach 
of contract claim because he has not identified an 
enforceable contract. Because Plaintiff does not specify 
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the state law under which his claim arises, the Court 
assumes that California law applies. 
To assert a cause of action for breach of contract in 
California, a plaintiff must plead: (1) existence of a 
contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for 
non-performance; the defendant’s breach; and (4) 
damages to the plaintiff as a result of the breach. 
Armstrong Petrol. Corp. v. Tri–Valley Oil & Gas Co., 
116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1391 n. 6, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 
(2004). 
Plaintiff has not identified a contract that he is 
seeking to enforce. Although he refers to an NCAA 
document as a contract, he does not attach the 
document to his complaint. Instead, he states that by 
signing the document, the athletes agree that “they 
have ‘read and understand’ the NCAA’s rules” and that 
“to the best of [their] knowledge [they] have not 
violated any amateurism rules.” Compl. ¶ 14. These 
phrases, on their own, do not indicate that the 
document is a contract. Plaintiff’s breach of contract 
claim against NCAA is dismissed with leave to amend 
to allege or attach an enforceable contract. 
V. Unjust Enrichment Claims 
Plaintiff claims that EA and CLC were unjustly 
enriched through the sale of video games that use his 
likeness. EA and CLC argue that his claim is barred 
because California law does not provide a cause of 
action for unjust enrichment. Even if it did, EA and 
CLC argue, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the 
existence of a contract with NCAA would 
independently bar an unjust enrichment claim. 
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California courts appear to be split on whether 
there is an independent cause of action for unjust 
enrichment. Baggett v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 582 F. 
Supp. 2d 1261, 1270–71 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (applying 
California law). One view is that unjust enrichment is 
not a cause of action, or even a remedy, but rather a 
general principle, underlying various legal doctrines 
and remedies. McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal.App.4th 
379, 387, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 115 (2004). In McBride, the 
court construed a “purported” unjust enrichment claim 
as a cause of action seeking restitution. Id. There are at 
least two potential bases for a cause of action seeking 
restitution: (1) an alternative to breach of contract 
damages when the parties had a contract which was 
procured by fraud or is unenforceable for some reason; 
and (2) where the defendant obtained a benefit from the 
plaintiff by fraud, duress, conversion, or similar conduct 
and the plaintiff chooses not to sue in tort but to seek 
restitution on a quasi-contract theory. Id. at 388, 20 
Cal.Rptr.3d 115. In the latter case, the law implies a 
contract, or quasi-contract, without regard to the 
parties’ intent, to avoid unjust enrichment. Id. 
Another view is that a cause of action for unjust 
enrichment exists and its elements are receipt of a 
benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the 
expense of another. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 
Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000); First 
Nationwide Savings v. Perry, 11 Cal.App.4th 1657, 
1662–63, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 (1992). 
Even under the more restrictive analysis of 
McBride, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads claims for 
restitution against EA and CLC on the theory that 
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they obtained a benefit from him through their alleged 
wrongful conduct. His breach of contract claim against 
NCAA does not bar these claims. Although EA and 
CLC correctly note that the existence of such a 
contract could bar a restitutionary claim against a 
contracting party, it is not clear that his alleged 
contract with NCAA defined any rights between him 
and EA and CLC. Cf. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Aetna U.S. 
Healthcare of Cal., 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172, 114 
Cal.Rptr.2d 109 (2001) (holding that “as a matter of law, 
a quasi-contract action for unjust enrichment does not 
lie where, as here, express binding agreements exist 
and define the parties’ rights”). Thus, Plaintiff has 
adequately stated his unjust enrichment claim for 
restitution against EA and CLC. 
VI. EA’s Anti–SLAPP Motion to Strike 
Finally, EA moves under California Code of Civil 
Procedure section 425.16 to strike all of Plaintiff’s 
claims against it. Section 425.16(b)(1), which addresses 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation 
(SLAPP), provides, 
A cause of action against a person arising from 
any act of that person in furtherance of the 
person’s right of petition or free speech under 
the United States or California Constitution in 
connection with a public issue shall be subject to 
a special motion to strike, unless the court 
determines that the plaintiff has established that 
there is a probability that the plaintiff will 
prevail on the claim. 
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California anti-SLAPP motions are available to 
litigants proceeding in federal court. Thomas v. Fry’s 
Elecs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1206, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005). 
California courts analyze anti-SLAPP motions in two 
steps. “First, the court decides whether the defendant 
has made a threshold showing that the challenged 
cause of action is one arising from protected activity.” 
Equilon Enter. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 
67, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685 (2002). Second, the 
court “determines whether the plaintiff has 
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” 
Id. 
Assuming that the challenged causes of action arise 
from protected activity, Plaintiff makes a sufficient 
showing of his probability of success on the merits. EA 
incorrectly argues that Plaintiff has a substantial 
burden to show probability of success. It maintains that 
the Court must apply “the same standard governing 
motions for summary judgment, nonsuit, or directed 
verdict.” EA’s Mot. to Strike at 12. However, this 
standard does not apply in federal court. 
“At the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, the 
required probability that [a party] will prevail need not 
be high.” Hilton, 580 F.3d at 888–89. The “statute does 
not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises 
out of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning; it 
subjects to potential dismissal only those actions in 
which the plaintiff cannot state and substantiate a 
legally sufficient claim.” Id. at 888 (quoting Navellier v. 
Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 93, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 
703 (2002)) (quotation marks omitted). In Thomas v. 
Fry’s Electronics, the case that provides that 
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anti-SLAPP motions are available to litigants 
proceeding in federal court, the court stated that 
“federal courts may not impose a heightened pleading 
requirement in derogation of federal notice pleading 
rules.” 400 F.3d at 1207; see also Empress LLC v. City 
& County of S.F., 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.2005) 
(holding that “a heightened pleading standard should 
only be applied when the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure so require”); Verizon, Inc. v. Covad 
Commc’ns. Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that procedural “state laws are not used in 
federal court if to do so would result in a direct collision 
with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure” and noting that 
federal courts have “accordingly refused to apply 
certain discovery-limiting provisions of the 
anti-SLAPP statute because they would conflict with 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56”). 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Plaintiff 
has sufficiently stated his claims against EA. 
Accordingly, the Court denies EA’s special motion to 
strike Plaintiff’s claims as a SLAPP. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES 
EA’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 34), GRANTS 
NCAA’s Motion in part and DENIES it in part (Docket 
No. 48), DENIES CLC’s Motion (Docket No. 47) and 
DENIES EA’s Motion to Strike (Docket No. 35). 
Plaintiff’s claims for violation of his Indiana right of 
publicity and breach of contract against NCAA are 
dismissed with leave to amend. In accordance with this 
Court’s Order of January 15, 2010 on consolidation, 
Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of this Order to 
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file a consolidated amended complaint. A case 
management conference is scheduled for April 27, 2010 
at 2:00 p.m. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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Before:  THOMAS and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and 
QUIST, Senior District Judge. 
 
Filed Aug. 21, 2013 
Appellant’s motion for stay of the issuance of the 
mandate pending application for writ of certiorari is 
GRANTED.  Fed. R. App. P. 41(b).  
Therefore, it is ordered that the mandate is stayed 
pending the filing of the petition for writ of certiorari in 
the Supreme Court.  The stay shall continue until final 
disposition by the Supreme Court. 
 
